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ABSTRACT

This study guide may be used as a reader for exploratory discussions among college students and educators interested in peace, world order, and global change studies. The essays and reprints of journal articles in the guide are general introductions to the issues covered by world order education. The first article, "World Resources and the World Middle Class," presents the dynamics between global population growth, the development of a world middle class, and the physical and environmental constraints of the planet. "Hunger and World Order" demonstrates that world hunger and poverty are sustained by national arms expenditures and balance of payments concerns. "A Strategy for System Change" presents a plan for universal disarmament which could be initiated unilaterally by the United States. "Human Development and the Security Straitjacket" considers whether human aggression is inherently constructive or destructive. "The Program of the Institute for World Order" analyzes different perceptions of and responses to the current global transformation. "Third World and World Order" articulates from a Third World perspective the challenges developing countries face in a world nearing environmental limits. The last two articles focus on "Women and World Order" and the "World Order Declaration" issued at the 1977 Montreal meeting of the World Order Models Project. (Author/RM)

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Peace And World Order Education

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A Study Guide/Mini Course

1981

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This study guide may be used as a reader for exploratory discussions or formal study groups among students and educators interested in peace, world order and global change studies.

Published By The Curriculum Program
Project For Global Education

"World Resources and the World Middle Class" by Nathan Keyfitz presents the dynamics between global population growth, the development of a world middle class and the physical and environmental constraints of the planet. 4

"Hunger and World Order," by Miriam Therese MacGillis, O.P. and Gerald Mische, demonstrates that world hunger and poverty are sustained by national arms expenditures and balance of payments concerns. 11

"A Strategy for System Change" is excerpted from **Robert Johansen's Toward A Dependable Peace.** It presents a plan for universal disarmament which could be initiated unilaterally by the United States. 17

"Human Development and the 'Security Straitjacket' " by Gerald and Patricia Mische considers whether human aggression is inherently constructive or destructive. Individual human needs are compared with societal needs as related to the fulfillment of a human world order. 21

In the essay **"The Program of the Institute for World Order," Saul Mendlovitz** analyzes different perceptions of and responses to the current global transformation. Mendlovitz proposes a world order, global humanist response. 25

Foaud Ajami's essay, "Third World and World Order" articulates from a Third World perspective the challenges developing countries face in a world nearing environmental limits. 27

"Women and World Order" by Patricia Mische discusses the role of women in transforming a "man made" warlike world into a humane and peaceful world and the dilemma of equality and the draft. 29

"The World Order Declaration" by Fouad Ajami and Richard Falk, was issued at the 1977 Montreal meeting of the World Order Models Project. It draws attention to the range of global problems and poses an intellectual posture which recognizes the imperative and challenges of realizing positive change. 30

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Project For Global Education

Our world shares a single destiny, and yet few people are informed of global problems and possible solutions. Rarely do our schools prepare us to think about the world, about planetary needs and long range planetary options. The future is in our hands, and yet we have not the data to fully understand the present. Needed, desperately, is a public education campaign for global awareness.

The PROJECT FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION is an effort by four organizations to promote global values and world order education. It is intended to stimulate thought and discussion among students, faculty and campus clergy about world problems and model futures. The PROJECT seeks to motivate the energy and creativity of the campus community to envision preferred future worlds and to begin organizing for their realization. Central to this task is the presence on each campus of educational programs which prepare students to understand and respond to serious global issues. The first critical step to building a new world order is taken when we adjust our thinking and learning processes. The PROJECT is designed to inspire and equip students, faculty and ministers to promote curriculum expansion for peace and world order studies and to engender thought on alternative models for the future.

History and Goals

The PROJECT is sponsored by Global Education Associates, Institute for World Order, Planetary Citizens and World Federalists Association. It is the product of a conference in November, 1980 entitled "Campus Activism for Global Education and Planetary Citizenship." At the conference, forty students, faculty, ministers and representatives from several human interest organizations considered the need to promote greater understanding of serious global problems. Three programs were designed for implementation in the Spring of 1981: Curriculum expansion; Resources description and distribution; and Preferred Futures imaging and options.

Between January and July, 1981, these programs will be brought to thirty-five colleges in the Washington, DC, Vermont, Ohio and New York areas through visits by PROJECT staff and regional contact people. After visiting eight to ten schools in an area, the PROJECT will convene a regional conference of students, faculty and ministers from each school. Experts in global education and alternative world futures will hold seminars and answer questions about programs suitable for particular universities. The conferences will be designed to create regional networks of students and educators who are interested in collaborating in the Fall of 1981 and beyond. In early July, the PROJECT will host a culminating conference where those persons most active in the regions will evaluate the PROJECT and help shape its future design.

The Curriculum Program

The Curriculum Program is designed to equip students, in cooperation with interested faculty and campus clergy, to organize for the integration of peace and world order studies into formal curricula. The Curriculum Working Group has developed a "How To" Organizing Manual including essays from students who have organized for world order studies and from faculty who teach peace and world order. Model programs at Catholic, Colgate and Georgetown Universities are described by students in those programs. A Study Guide has been prepared to orient students and educators to the content of world order education; it can be used as a reader for exploratory mini-courses and discussion groups. The program will distribute *Peace and World Order Studies* (Institute for World Order, 1981), a curriculum guide; this publication provides syllabi from peace and world order studies courses across the United States.

When visiting campuses, the PROJECT staff will encourage students to participate in curriculum expansion as a constructive and meaningful form of activism. Students interested in curriculum expansion will identify and contact faculty with a known interest in world order. Equipped with the "How To" Manual, Study Guide and Curriculum Guide, students and faculty will be able to design a program suitable for their school. Based on experiences on other campuses and the structure of the particular university, a strategy for implementing the program can be devised. At the regional conference, experts in global education and world order will offer advice and students and faculty from the various schools will meet and discuss their initiatives.

The Resources Program

The Resources Program is intended to make known and available to students a wide range of materials relevant to world order and alternative world futures. The Resources Working Group has prepared an annotated Bibliography which lists available books, journals, speakers, audio-visuals and organizations in the following categories:

- Global Perspective
- World Hunger and Poverty
- Alternative Futures and Lifestyles
- Racial Justice and Religious Freedom
- War and Peace
- Development
- Environment
- Energy
- United Nations
- Women
- Human Rights

In addition, the PROJECT has established a Resource Center at the World Federalists Association headquarters in Arlington, Virginia. Some of the materials described in the bibliography are available from the Resource Center at reduced cost. Persons ordering materials will be asked to evaluate their effectiveness to assist the sponsors of the PROJECT in developing materials most useful *to the campus community.*

The Preferred Futures Program

The Preferred Futures Program will bring to campuses materials and processes which promote understanding of future options for the planet, nation and individual. The program utilizes two complimentary approaches: The first emphasizes futures-imaging whereby participants conceptualize the preferred future: scenarios which reflect the resolution of global and national problems. The second approach presents alternative models of the future to provide an orientation to structural possibilities, probabilities and related implications.

The Preferred Futures Working Group has prepared a four-part slide show presenting an overview of the planet in 1980, two video tapes presenting world order education, written scenarios describing alternative world futures, and audio-taped exercises guiding listeners to image their own preferred futures. These materials will be brought to campuses by PROJECT staff for both in-class presentations and publicized open discussions. Those students most interested in continuing preferred futures activities will be invited to participate in the regional conferences, where specialists in alternative world futures will supplement the presentations made on campuses.

The values which guide the PROJECT's focus are peace, economic well-being, social justice and ecology. Consequently, the PROJECT is most concerned with the problems of war and militarism, poverty and hunger, abuse of human rights, authoritarianism, and abuse and depletion of the environment. *The emphasis is placed on the interrelationship of global problems and the need for comprehensive global solutions.* The PROJECT encourages students and educators to develop and compare models of future worlds which make possible the resolution of global problems.

Study Guide/Mini Course

The PROJECT FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION is proud to publish this Study Guide/Mini-Course as part of its Curriculum Program. The goal of the Curriculum Program is to expand contemporary college curricula to include the study of peace, "World Order" and global change issues. This guide contains essays and articles which reflect the subject matter and intellectual perspective of an emerging and relevant academic discipline. The publication provides an orientation to peace and world order education and may serve as a reader for exploratory discussions or formal study groups among students and educators interested in integrating peace and world order studies into their college educations.

Global education is guided by the following inquiry: What questions must human civilization address, what problems need be resolved to ensure survival and justice on the planet? The pursuit of a just world order is both an intellectual challenge and a political responsibility. Learning about the world helps prepare us to understand and respond to the most basic issues which determine our survival.

Global education includes the empirical study of global problems (war, hunger, etc.) and world trends, with emphasis on the magnitude of particular problems and the forces which affect them. It involves an analysis of proposed solutions to global problems and takes into account theories of human nature, ideology and system change. Further, such study obliges students to participate in the process of developing creative solutions. We are all authors of the future.

The PROJECT FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION seeks to equip students and educators to explore prospects for integrating peace and world order education into existing courses and programs. The formation of peace and world order studies majors and departments is also encouraged, after initial courses have been trialed and proved viable and popular. Toward this end, this Study Guide/Mini-Course may be used as a reader for extracurricular and independent study courses formed by students and educators considering working together for curriculum expansion. This publication can be supplemented with the PROJECT's "How To Organize for Peace and World Order Education" Manual, available from the PROJECT FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION Resource Center (c/o World Federalists Association, 1011 Arlington Blvd., W-219, Arlington, VA 22209; 703-524-2141).

The selections in this publication are general introductions to the issues covered by world order education. Further readings on each topic are available in libraries and book stores. Class sylibi and bibliographies from peace and world order courses have been compiled in **Peace and World Order Studies** (IWO, 1981), available through the PROJECT's Resource Center or directly from the Institute for World Order (777 United Nations Plaza, New York, NY 10017; 212-490-0010).

The PROJECT FOR GLOBAL EDUCATION has been made possible through generous contributions by supporters of the sponsoring organizations. The curriculum working group wishes to thank the authors of each selection and also the sponsoring organizations of the PROJECT. We are particularly grateful for assistance from Gerald Mische and Bill Osterle of Global Education Associates and to Sherle Schwenninger of the Institute for World Order. May this publication further education and action for a just and peaceful world.

Shawn Gilford, Richard Perl, Warren Reardon, Joan Wathen and the Curriculum Working Group of the Project for Global Education.

World Resources And The World Middle Class

by Nathan Keyfitz

How much economic development is possible? Surely the planet and its materials are finite and not even all its present four billion people can live like Americans, let alone the six or eight billion that on present trends will be alive when a stationary world population is established. Indeed, there is doubt whether the 250 million people expected to populate the U.S. in the year 2000 will be able to live as Americans do today. How far, then, can industrial society spread through the preindustrial world before it reaches a ceiling imposed by space, raw materials and waste disposal?

That is the wrong question to ask, if human knowledge and capacity for substitution and the resilience of economic systems are unbounded, as they may well be. In that case, the right question — and certainly a more tractable and pragmatic question — is how *fast* can development progress, whether toward an ultimate limit or not? What rate of technical innovation can be attained, oriented to allow a corresponding rate of expansion of industry, and how many of the world's people will that expansion enable to enter the middle class each year?

Attainment of the middle-class style of life is what constitutes development in countries as widely separated geographically and ideologically as Brazil and the U.S.S.R. In the process peasants gain education, move to cities and adopt urban occupations and urban patterns of expenditure. Changes are involved in people themselves, in where they live, in their kind of work and in the nature of the goods they consume. These changes can be visualized in terms of a definable line, comparable to the poverty line officially drawn in the U.S., across which people aspire to move. The pertinent questions then become: How many people are moving across the line each year, what is their effect on resources, at what rate can resources be expanded by new techniques and therefore what is the size of the window through which the world's poor will climb into the middle class during the remainder of this century and beyond it?

A main issue of development for many of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America is how to enlarge that window into the middle class. Since, according to a generally accepted view, it is middle-class people who limit their families, the rate of movement into that class helps to determine the level at which the world population can be stabilized, and that level in turn will determine the degree of well-being that can be supported by world resources. And if shortage of resources makes the opening into the middle class as it is presently constituted so narrow that the majority will never be able to pass through it, then the sooner we know this the better. The Chinese rather than the Brazilian-Russian pattern of development may be what people will have to settle for.

The questions I have raised are difficult for many reasons, including the lack of statistical information, uncertainty about the capacity of productive systems to substitute common materials for scarce ones and uncertainty about the directions in which technology will advance. Some data and some pointers are available, however.

Let us begin with population. The world population, according to the United Nations estimates I shall be following, passed the four-billion mark in 1975. It had passed the three-billion mark in 1960. Whereas the last billion was added in 15 years, the first billion had taken from the beginning (one or two million years ago) until 1825. The growth has been far faster than exponential growth at a fixed rate of increase (as with compound interest); instead the rate rose from something like an average of .001 percent per year through the millenniums of prehistory to 1.9 percent through the decade and a half from 1960 to 1975.

Apparently the rate of increase will not rise further. The same 1.9 percent, according to the UN medium variant, will hold until 1990, and by the end of the century the increase will be down to 1.6 percent per year. Other estimates place the peak earlier and make the decline in rate of increase faster. Insofar as the increasing rate of increase constituted a population "explosion," we can draw relief from the fact that we are now down to "only" exponential growth. (This peaking was inevitable because of what mainly caused the rise to begin with: the decline in mortality during infancy and childhood. Mortality improvement after the reproductive ages does not affect increase much and in the long run does not affect it at all. Once the chance that a newborn infant will survive to reproduce itself gets up to about .90 the scope for further rise is limited, and whatever rise takes place will be offset by even a small decline in the birthrate.)



"POPULATION EXPLOSION" CURVE is the result of more-than-exponential growth; the annual rate of increase has itself been rising, most sharply in the past century, largely because of the decline in infant and childhood mortality. In this layer chart the total population (projected to the year 2050 according to the United Nations medium estimate) is given for countries currently classified by the UN as "developed" (*light color*) and "less developed" (*dark color*).

Reprinted from: ***Scientific American*, July 1976.**

Those who worry about the population explosion can take some comfort in this peaking of the rate of increase, but not very much. Dropping to exponential growth still leaves the world population increasing (on the UN medium variant) by about 75 million per year now, with the annual increment rising to 100 million by the end of the century. And the absolute increase, rather than the rate, seems to be what matters. To feed the present yearly increment requires nearly 20 million tons of additional grain each year, which is more than the Canadian wheat crop and about the same as the crops of Argentina, Australia and Romania taken together. To look after the annual increment of population on even a minimum basic is going to be difficult enough; the real issue, however, is not how many people can live but how many can live well.

Production of most things consumed by the world's people has been increasing at a higher rate than the 1.9 percent per year of population. During the period from 1960 to 1973 meat output increased at 2.8 percent a year, newsprint at 3.7 percent, motor vehicles at 6.8 percent and energy consumption at 4.9 percent, and the rise was similar for many other commodities. These numbers can be taken to mean that on the average mankind is year by year eating better and reading more, becoming more mobile and substituting machine power for the power of human muscles. Such a conclusion would seem to be confirmed by worldwide figures on productive activity or income. For example, adding up the gross domestic products of all countries for 1970 yields a gross world produce to $3,219 billion, an average of $881 per head. The total has been going up at nearly 5 percent per year in real terms, that is, after price increases. Even allowing for the 1.9 percent increase in population, we seem to be getting better off individually at about 3 percent per year. Projecting on this basis, real goods per head would double every 23 years; each generation would be twice as well off as the preceding one. To dispose of twice as much wealth as one's parents, four times as much as one's grandparents, surely cannot be regarded as unsatisfactory; the world, such figures seem to show, is moving toward affluence. That conclusion requires substantial qualification.

The division of a total number of dollars by a number of individuals to obtain an average per head has a long tradition; dividing one number by another is an innocent operation and without any necessary implication that everyone obtains the average, and yet it puts thoughts into people's minds. The first thought might be that things are not bad with $881 per head for the entire global population — a conservative conclusion. The second thought might be that things would indeed not be bad if the total was actually divided up — a radical viewpoint that has been voiced often in recent years. Income is an aspect of a way of life, however, and only a trifling part of a way of life is directly transferable.

The fallacy of redivision is encouraged by putting income into terms of money and performing arithmetical division. To say we should divide income so that everyone in the world can have his $881 is to solve a real problem with a verbal or arithmetical trick, because behind the numbers is the fact that Americans live one way and Indians another way. If, starting tomorrow, Americans were all to live like Indians, then their higher incomes would simply disappear. There would be nothing to transfer.

How much is transferable depends on the extent to which Americans could consume like Indians while continuing to produce like Americans. Simon Kuznets and others have pointed out that as soon as one tries to plan a transfer the tight bond between production and consumption frustrates the attempt. For example, the cost of travel to work is called consumption, but if people stopped traveling to work, production would fall to zero. What about the cost of holidays and entertainment, which are elements of consumption but which refresh people for further work? What about nutrition, education and health services? And what about the enjoyment of consumer goods that is the incentive to work and earn? All of these and many other parts of consumption feed back into production. Moreover, to discuss massive transfers of capital would be futile for political reasons even if it were economically practical: the declining U.S. foreign-aid budget shows how unappealing to the major donor this path to world development is.

Because the world population is heterogeneous, no style of life is in fact associated with the world average of $881. Following that average through time leads to the mistaken impression that things are getting better every year and will do so indefinitely. Even a two-way breakdown of the average is a major step toward realism.

Of the total world population of four billion estimated for 1975, 1.13 billion, or nearly 30 percent, live in developed countries. The fraction of the annual increment of population accounted for by those countries is much less, however: only 10 million out of 75 million, or 13 percent. The annual increment in the less developed countries is more than 65 million, and it will rise to 90 million by the end of the century (again on the UN medium estimates). This division of the world into two kinds of countries, rich and poor, or more developed and less developed, has become familiar since World War II. That world 1970 product (or income) of $881 per head is in fact an average of the developed countries' $2,701 and the less developed countries' $208.

Recent fluctuation obscure the long-term rates of increase, but suppose income for the rich and poor countries alike increases at 5 percent per year in the long term. On the population side, suppose the future increase is .5 percent per year among the developed countries and 2.5 percent per year among the less developed. Allowing for these population numbers brings the 5 percent annual gain in total product that was assumed for both down to about 4.5 percent for the developed countries and only 2.5 percent for the less developed ones.

The result is a widening gap between the two groups of countries, an exercise in the mathematics of geometric increase (*see illustration).* Think of the developed countries starting at $2,701 per capita and increasing at 4.5 percent per year in real terms; after 25 years they have risen threefold, to a per capita income of more than $8,000 in 1995. By that time the income per head in the less developed countries has not even doubled: their $208 has risen to only $386. By the year 2020 the grandchildren of the present generation will have, in the one set of countries, more than $24,000 per head and in the other countries the still very modest $715 — one thirty-fourth as much as the rich, and not yet as much as the 1970 world average!

The calculation shows how a heterogeneous population is bound to develop a widening gap between rich and poor if per



WIDENING GAP between per capita incomes in the developed and in the less developed countries is caused by the more rapid growth of population in poor countries. UN figures for the developed (*light color*) and less developed (*dark color*) countries and for the world as a whole (*gray*) were projected on the assumption that total income will continue to increase at 5 percent per year in both sets of countries but that the population of the developed countries increases at only .5 percent per year while that of less developed countries increases at 2.5 percent.

capita rates of increase are frozen. I have assumed that all national incomes increase at 5 percent per year. Overall national-income growth is not conspicuously different, on the average, for the poor and the rich countries, and so it is the differences in population growth that are decisive.

To speak of developed and less developed countries is an improvement on treating the world as being homogeneous, but it has been overtaken by the events of the past three years. Where two categories of countries once sufficed, we now find we cannot do with fewer than four.

The shifts in raw-material prices have created resource-rich countries such as Abu Dhabi and Venezuela, whose wealth is comparable to that of the developed countries, which by way of contrast can be called capital-rich. Some countries that were poor have actually been developing, including Singapore, Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Finally there are the many countries that are truly poor, lacking (in relation to their population) both capital and resources. We have, then, the resource-rich countries, the capital-rich countries, the developing countries and the poor countries. Specifically identifying and classifying all cases to provide numbers for population in these groups is not easy. (Indonesia has resources but not enough so that any like rise in prices would make its 135 million people rich.) The new categories of resource-rich and developing countries might be defined in such a way that they total 200 million people each; the fact remains that most of the world's people are in countries that have no leverage through either control of capital or control of resources.

No country is homogeneous, however; the poorest countries contain some rich people and the richest contain some poor. Nations and their governments dominate our age so completely that individuals too easily drop out of political as well as statistical view, yet the welfare of governments is not a worthy ultimate objective; it is the people of the poor countries, who deserve our concern. And so what follows will deal as directly as possible with people.

The typical poor person and the typical middle-class person is easy to visualize; the first is a peasant in Java, Nigeria, the Brazilian Northeast or elsewhere in Asia, Africa and the Americas; the second is a city dweller in San Francisco, Frankfurt, Leningrad or Tokyo with an office job that puts him well above the poverty line. There are less obvious representatives. Along with the peasant group one should count as poor the wage laborer of Calcutta or the urban unemployed of the U.S. And the middle-class group includes the unionized construction worker, the bus driver, the keypunch operator and the successful farmer in the U.S., Europe, the U.S.S.R. or Japan; that some of these are considered blue-collar is secondary to their earning a middle-class income.

In survey after survey most Americans, when they are asked where they think they belong, place themselves in the middle class. The self-classification by which most Americans tend to call themselves middle-class and Indians tend to call themselves poor accords with the distinction I have made. Most of those called middle-class in the world live in the cities of the rich countries, but some of them live in poor countries and some live in the countryside. The crucial part of the distinction is that middle-class people are in a position to make effective claim to a share of the world's resources that accords with modern living.

With an income measure of welfare, people fall on a continuum and the location of the poverty line is arbitrary. As a country grows richer its standards rise, so that the same fraction of its population may be defined as "poor" even as everyone in the country is becoming better off. In the case of the U.S., however, it has been possible to reach broad agreement on a Social Security Administration definition of poverty based on relatively objective criteria. An average urban family of four, including two children, is said to require $3,700 a year (at 1974 prices) to pay rent, buy clothing and meet basic nutritionals needs, and similar levels are set for other types of household.

"Middle-class" describes a style of life and can cover not only physical needs as power lawn mowers and winter vacations in Florida. It needs to be specified separately for each culture before one can see how many people enjoy it and what the energy and resource consequences of the enjoyment are. Pending such a study I propose to call middle-class those who are above the equivalent of the U.S. poverty line, wherever they may live. Cultural differences make poverty in one country intrinsically noncomparable with poverty in another country, but they make average money incomes just as noncomparable. The effort to quantify important notions must not be prevented by some degree of qualitative difference, the fraction under the level of consumption represented by the U.S. poverty line is not the definitive way of measuring the world's poor, but it will serve for the moment. In the U.S. that fraction was 11.6 percent in 1974, an increase from 11.1 in 1973 but a decrease from 22.4 in 1959. Of the U.S. population of 210 million in 1973, some 23 million were poor; call the remaining 187 million middle-class. Let us try to find indexes that will provide a corresponding number for other countries.

Passenger cars in use might be taken as roughly proportional to the middle-class, or above-poverty, population. In the U.S. in 1973 the number of passenger cars was 101 million and in the world as a whole it was 233 million, a ratio of 2.3. Insofar as the

233 million passenger cars in the world are being driven and ridden in by a world middle class, we can multiply the U.S. middle class, of 187 million by 2.3 and derive a world total of 430 million middle-class people. This number is too low, because automobiles are less a part of daily life even in other affluent countries; we know that trains continue to be used in Europe for much travel that is done in the U.S. by automobile.

Let us try telephones as the indicator. The world total in 1973 was 336 million telephones and the U.S. total was 138 million. On this index the world middle class was 187 million times 336/187, or 455 million. With electric energy as the indicator a similar calculation gives a world middle class of 580 million. Each one of these indicators is surely defective. One can nonetheless hope that their defects are more or less constant over the 20 years or so that I propose to apply them to establish a trend.

A slightly different way of doing the calculation is to take it that modern living requires about four metric tons of crude oil a year for heating, air conditioning and motoring, so that the world output in 1973, 2,774 million tons, could cover the needs of 700 million people. (The calculation is approximate because some poor people do use a little oil and large supplies go to military and other government uses.)

Averaging the several approaches gives a world middle class of 500 million for 1970. What is important is that the corresponding average number — indexed on automobiles, telephones, electric energy, oil and other items — was something like 200 million for 1950. That indicates an average increase of 4.7 percent per year in the world middle class: the workers, and their families, who are integrated into industrial society, utilize its materials as the basis of their jobs and apply their incomes to consume its product. In doing so they have an impact on resources and on the environment. Just how great is the impact of change in status from poor to middle class, particularly compared with the effect of population change?

Raw materials are used by people, and so, if all else is fixed, the drain on resources must be proportional to the number of people. If each year the world population is 1.9 percent larger than it was the year before and nothing else changes, then each year resources are claimed by 1.9 percent more people, and in the course of 37 years we shall be on the average twice as dense on the land and shall be consuming twice as much iron and other metals and twice as much crude oil. This statement is not true of pollution, where more-than-proportional effects enter. It is true of resources insofar as technology for production and patterns of consumption both remain constant.

Actually they do not remain constant; they exert effects in opposite directions. Technology has been stretching the use of materials. We know how to put the tin on the can more thinly; we can make rubber and fabrics out of coal; we recycle aluminum. The movement, guided by price changes, is always toward less scarce materials. As income goes up, however, per capita consumption increases: more cans are used, albeit each with a thinner layer of tin. Worse still, new materials are invented — detergents, plastics, insecticides — that take a long time to reenter the cycles of nature once we are through with them. It is the net effect of these tendencies that we need to estimate.

One way to get at the net effect of increased consumption per head and of technological improvements is to determine the residual change after population increase is allowed for. Let us try this for energy consumption in the U.S. in 1947 and 1973. The 1947 consumption was 1.21 billion tons of coal equivalent and the 1973 consumption was 2.55 billion. Meanwhile the population rose from 144 million to 210 million. If the larger population of 1973 had held to the same volume and patterns of consumption and production as the smaller population of 1947, it would have required 1.77 billion tons of coal equivalent. Hence of the total increase of 1.34 billion only .56 billion was due to population growth; the remainder of the increase, .78 billion, was due to affluence. Affluence was more important than population (*see illustration).* Similar calculations can be made for metals and other materials, for pollution, for the primary caloric content of food, indeed for any kind of impact that can be measured.

As an alternative way of analyzing the consumption of materials, consider that from 1950 to 1970 the part of the world population that was affluent went from 200 million to 500 million: while total population increases at 1.9 percent per year, middle-class high consumers increase at 4.7 percent. Each high consumer requires the equivalent of three-quarters of a ton of grain, whereas the poor get by on a quarter of a ton. (The consequent ratio of land use is less than three to one, because agriculture is more efficient in rich countries.) The middle-class person requires from 15 to 30 barrels of oil, whereas the poor person makes do with one barrel at most in the form of kerosene, bus fuel and fertilizer. The land and energy content of clothing may be in a rich-to-poor ratio intermediate between those for food and for transport. As a kind of average of these several ratios, suppose the middle-class person has five times as much impact on the material base as the poor person. Then the average person on the high side of the poverty line must be taken as being equivalent to five people on the low side in fuel and metals consumed. In considering impact we therefore calculate as though in 1975 the planet had not four billion people aboard but 6.4 billion. Of these, 3.4 billion were poor and three billion represented the fivefold impact of a world middle class that probably



U.S. ENERGY CONSUMPTION would have increased from 1.21 billion tons of coal equivalent in 1947 to 1.77 billion tons in 1973 if it had merely kept pace with the rise in population. In fact, however, energy consumption rose to 2.55 billion tons in 1973. The increment (*light color*) due to a rise in per capita consumption stemming from affluence was larger than the increment (*dark color*) attributable to population growth. The same is true of many other materials.

numbered 600 million.

This would make the average total impact of the small middle class on resources somewhat less than that of the large number of the poor. The middle class has been increasing at 4.7 percent per year, however, and the poor less than half as fast. At the growing edge the increase of affluence has much more effect than the increase of population; the movement of people into the middle class has more effect on materials and the environment than the increase in the number of poor people.

Indeed, it has so much effect that if the population explosion is now ending (in the sense that the world rate of increase is peaking at 1.9 percent per year and starting to decline), we now face another explosion. It arises from the arithmetic of combining two exponentials, which is to say two progressions (population growth and middle-class growth) each of which has a fixed ratio.

The effect can be expressed in stylized form by supposing the 1975 population of four billion projected forward in the ratio 1.6 every 25 years (equal to the fixed rate of 1.9 percent per year). Suppose at the same time that the middle class triples every 25 years (equivalent to a fixed 4.5 percent per year), as it did from 1950 to 1975. The poor population is the difference between the resulting numbers. If the people above the poverty line average five times the impact of those below it, then we must add five times the middle class to a number of poor for the total impact. The result is a steadily increasing rate of increase of the impact, from 2.7 percent per year in 1950-1975 to 3.1 percent and then to 3.5 percent *(see illustration)*. This is based on continuance of 1950-1970 rates of economic development and of population growth. Population growth will slow down, but that will not greatly reduce the impact, which in this illustration would be increasingly due to affluence. Our difficulties in maintaining the population and affluence levels of 1976 suggest that this model will not work. We cannot hope to keep tripling the middle class every 25 years. The main reason is shortage of resources.



FUTURE IMPACT on world resources is affected by the growth of the middle class, whose members are assumed to consume five times as much as poor people. In population alone the middle class (*dark gray*), increasing at 4.5 percent per year, would eventually be larger than the poor population (*light gray*). When the middle class is multiplied by five, the resulting "consumption population" (*color*) is seen to grow at an annual rate that increases from 2.7 to 3.1 and then to 3.5 percent. World resources are already strained by the 1975 "consumption population."

Natural resources account for only about 5 percent of the value of goods and services produced in the U.S. and other developed countries. Resources are hence curiously two-sided: extracting them accounts for only a small part of the cost, yet they are the sine qua non of existence, to say nothing of progress. And particular materials do run out. England's Industrial Revolution was in part a response to a firewood crisis: cheap coal was substituted for wood, which had become scarce and very dear. In America, on the other hand, wood was cheap and labor was dear, so that houses were built of wood rather than stone, which is more labor-intensive. Now timber is dear here also, and masonry and aluminum are substituted in some products. Plastics take the place of paper in packaging. Cultivated southern pine is used for newsprint instead of the limited pine and spruce of the northern forests.

Thus history shows the resilience of the productive system, its ability to substitute commoner materials for scarce ones. Nevertheless, the extrapolation of this capacity must take account of time. Invention, innovation and capital replacement can proceed only at a certain pace. It is this pace of innovation that needs to be studied, since it sets the rate at which industrial society can spread in the face of environmental and resource limitations.

Limits to the spread of industrial society under present technology are suggested by the record of trade in raw materials over the past quarter-century. To take one example, in 1950 the production and consumption of energy were in virtual balance for the developed countries as a whole. Their deficit amounted to less than 4 percent of consumption. By 1973 production in the developed countries had nearly doubled but consumption had far outrun it and the deficit had swollen to a third of consumption.

The story for metals and other resources is not very different. No country, developed or not, has been provided by nature with a greater quantity and variety of mineral and other resources than the U.S. Yet even the U.S. had become a net importer of minerals by the 1920's, and it now imports all its platinum, mica and chromium, 96 percent of its aluminum, 85 percent of its asbestos, 77 percent of its tin and 28 percent of its iron — to select from a long list. Of course, the shortages of some of these minerals are not absolute but are a matter of price. The U.S. could produce all the aluminum it needs from domestic clay, but bauxite from Jamaica is cheaper. Having virtually exhausted the iron ore of the Mesabi Range, the U.S. resorts to lower-grade domestic taconite and to imports in a proportion determined by prices.

The increase of more than 4 percent per year in the number of middle-class people who have come on the scene is too rapid in that these high consumers have to comb the world for re-

sources, but on the other hand it is much too slow to satisfy the billions of people who are waiting in the wings. Whereas Europe, Japan and the U.S.S.R. have made great gains during the UN Development Decades, most of Asia and Africa are dissatisfied with their progress. Moreover, a realistic calculation would probably show a larger gap between the impact on resources of those who have raised themselves from poverty and that of those who are still poor. The weight of a middle-class person is in many respects more than five times that of a peasant. It is to keep the argument conservative that I suppose the ratio is five times and that the world middle class triples every 25 years.

The combination of these two modest assumptions produces, as we have seen, a surprisingly high measure of impact for the end of the century, by which time the middle class, which was at 600 million in 1975, would increase to 1.8 billion and have the effect of five times that number, or nine billion. The total impact projected to the year 2000 is, then, that of nine billion plus 4.6 billion poor, or 13.6 billion people. This compares with an impact of 6.4 billion for 1975, calculated in the same way. If strains are already apparent in materials and energy, what will happen with a doubling of the rate of consumption?

The accelerating impact that appears from recognition of two categories of people rather than one category is offset in some degree by the decline in the impact per dollar of income once income rises beyond a certain level. People take very high incomes in services rather than in more and more automobiles. Moreover, the relation of impact to income varies from one culture to another, as an anthropologist would point out; an economist would add that the relation can be counted on to change as raw materials, and hence the goods made from them, became scarce and costly compared with less material-intensive forms of consumption. Although the impact on materials may taper off with increased wealth, the impact on air and water may be greater than proportional. There may be thresholds: the air may hold just so much carbon monoxide, a lake just so much fertilizer runoff, without undue effect, but beyond a certain critical point the effect may quickly rise to disaster levels. Such critical points clearly exist in renewable resources. Fishing or cutting timber up to a certain intensity does no damage at all, but continued overfishing or overcutting can destroy the fish or tree population.

The rate and direction of development of the period 1950—1970, unsatisfactory though it may be in that the absolute number of the poor would continue to increase until well into the 21st century, is still faster than can be sustained on present strategies. The resilience of the economic system, and technical innovation in particular, can be counted on to respond to needs, but only at a certain rate of speed. One can imagine sources of energy, the capacity to dispose of wastes and substitutes for metals all doubling in the century to come, but it is not easy to conceive of such a doubling in the 15 years that would keep the middle class growing at 4.7 percent per year.

To say that civilization will collapse when oil supplies are exhausted, or that we will pollute ourselves out of existence, is to deny all responsiveness and resilience to the productive system. The geologist or resource expert tends to focus on the material and technical process he knows and may be less than imaginative with regard to how a substitute might be found to deal with a shortage. On the other hand, the economist may be too imaginative; he may too readily suppose substitutes can be found for anything as soon as it becomes scarce. The ensuing debate between pessimistic raw material experts and optimistic economists has generated whatever knowledge we have on the subject. The middle ground to which both sides are tending is that every barrier that industrial expansion is now meeting can be surmounted by technological advance, but not in an instant. It is not a ceiling on total population and income that we have to deal with but that window. How large can the window be made?

One conclusion to be drawn from the arithmetic I did above is that a projection in terms of ratios is probably wrong in principle; in the face of natural and human limitations the pace of advance may be determined in absolute numbers rather than ratios. If, for example, pollution effects are proportional to fuel burned, then successive absolute increments in fuel consumption have the same bad effects on the fixed volume of the atmosphere. We should think not of the percent expansion of the middle class but of its absolute increase.

The calculation made in this way starts with the annual growth in world population of 75 million at the present time, gradually increasing to 100 million by the end of the century, and compares that increment with the number annually emerging into the middle class. If the latter went in a straight line from 200 million in 1950 to 500 million in 1970, then the average annual increase was 15 million. My stylized model, wherein industrial society expands through the emergence of people from the peasantry into city jobs as capital expands (while those not yet called remain at their old peasant incomes), goes back ultimately to Adam Smith. This simple application of the Smith model suggests that currently 15 million people join the middle class each year and 60 million join the poor. Even if the middle-class increment could rise to 20 million per year, the poor would still be increasing by 80 million per year at the end of the century. This at least is one reasonable extrapolation of the process of development in the post-war period. Other population estimates are lower than the UN's, but accepting them would lead to the same result: the large majority of the new generation will be poor. Therein lies the harm of rapid population growth.

The natural increase of the affluent population will create difficulties in the years ahead even though birthrates are low. Suppose the window is wide enough for 20 million to pass through it each year. Who will they be? The way the world is made, the children of the currently affluent of America, Europe and Japan will have first claim. The U.S.S.R. has found no way of preventing its elite from placing their children in the elite, and neither has the U.S. on the basis of 600 million for the middle class in 1975, a net natural-increase rate of .5 percent means three million children per year in excess of deaths. Apart from children who simply replace their parents or grandparents, of the 20 million net admissions each year three million would be further children of those who have already entered the middle class and 17 million would be new entrants. And these 17 million new entrants would be divided among the poor of the developed countries and those of the less developed countries, with the former having the better chance. Poor people in the poor countries sense that the odds against them and against their children are great.

All of this, it should be noted, can be seen as a critique not



CONSUMPTION AND PRODUCTION of energy were about balanced in 1950 in the developed countries: they produced the coal, oil, gas and hydropower whose energy they consumed, except for a small shortfall made up by imports from less developed countries. By 1973 rising production had been outstripped by consumption; shortfall amounted to a third of consumption.

of development, but of one particular model of development. The distinction between poor and middle-class represents the Brazilian and the Russian direction but not the Chinese. Whether because of China's special culture or the personality of Mao Tse-tung, both the specialization that equips people for middle-class jobs and the durable structures of industry and administration in which those jobs have their place have been insistently denied there. It is asserted that everyone can do everything, that people ought to take turns working as peasants, driving trucks and being scholars; people need only so much to eat, to wear and to live in, and consumerism beyond that austere minimum is vice, not virtue. Whether this view can spread among other cultures and without a regime of the same type is not clear. There is little present sign of its spreading even to India, let alone to Japan, Europe or America.

Thomas Malthus gave us a land theory of value, Karl Marx a labor theory and development economists since World War II a capital theory. Land, labor and capital are plainly all needed (and to assign priority to any one may be as much an ideological choice as a practical one), but a dynamic factor superimposed on all of them is new scientific and technical knowledge. At many points we need to know more in order even to discover the problems we face: only recently have we found out that insecticides can be dangerous poisons to organisms other than insects, and that the current worldwide rise in skin cancer may be related to depletion of the ozone layer of the upper atmosphere. Knowledge is needed even to see where the window restricting passage into the middle class is located, and only knowledge can open it wider.

Other ways of widening the window have been suggested. One is to raise the price of the raw materials on whose export some less developed countries depend for foreign exchange. Price increases such as those of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) can have little overall effect, however, on the number of middle-class people in the world (although they have some effect on whether the newly middle-class will speak Spanish or Arabic or English). Who ultimately bears the burden of such price raises is not clear. Some of the burden is carried by poor countries that are not endowed with raw materials; when the repercussions have worked themselves out, India may find it has contributed a higher proportion of its income to Saudi Arabian opulence than the U.S. has. Certainly some U.S. fertilizer that would have gone to India before 1973 now goes to the Middle East; German chemical-plant investments are similarly diverted. The offsetting of oil price rises by French arms sales to Iran has everything to do with national power and little to do with the total distribution of poverty or even the national distribution. The main point is that only a small fraction of the world population is in resource-rich areas.

A second way to help more people escape from poverty might be for those who have already entered the middle class to moderate their consumption. In principle, if one meat eater cuts his consumption, then five grain eaters can increase theirs. If American automobiles were smaller, more metals and fuel would be available for automobiles in Zaire and Bangla Desh as well as — more immediately — fertilizer plants in those countries. If urban Americans were to live like the equally affluent Swedes, U.S. energy consumption might be halved. The trouble is that goods, as well as jobs that require materials, fit into other social activities in an interlocking scheme that is hard to change; social configurations are as solid a reality as raw materials. After two years of talking conservation, the U.S. consumes as much fossil fuel as ever. Faced with a world shortage of raw materials, every person of goodwill wants to see wasteful practices reduced, but the intrinsic limits on transfers I mentioned at the outset and the enormous inertia stored in producing and spending patterns make reduced consumption an unlikely way for the U.S. to help the poor countries.

Foreign aid and investment along conventional lines are a third possibility, but they have been disappointing. They have aided in the development of some countries (Canada is a striking example), but for various reasons the volume is inadequate to the magnitude of the problem for most of the world's population. Even where investment is solidly based in economics some intellectuals argue that it creates dependency, and the politicians of poor countries often respond by expropriation. Ironically the very mention of expropriation is expensive for the poor country because it makes investors demand a higher return.

One can say that better prices for raw materials, reduction of consumption by the rich countries and conventional foreign aid and foreign investment all ought to be pursued, but the experience of the 1950's and the 1960's shows that they will not make a decisive difference in the size of the window through which escape from poverty is sought.

What will make a decisive difference is knowledge: of how to produce amenities with less material, how to substitute materials that are common for those that are scarce, how to get desired results with less energy and how to obtain that energy from renewable sources rather than from fossil fuels. We have seen some results in the past decade. With the advent of integrated circuits, a calculator that cost $1,000 and weighed 40 pounds is now replaced by one that costs $10 and weighs a few ounces. Artificial earth satellites have lowered the cost of communication; they provide television in Indian villages and may ultimately make telephone calls around the world as cheap as local calls.

Synthetic polymers have replaced cotton and wool and thus released land. The list of what is still needed is too long to itemize: efficient solar collectors, compact storage batteries to run automobiles on centrally generated power, stronger and cheaper plastics (for automobile bodies, for instance) and so on.

If the time dimension in the implementation of these inventions is crucial, then everything that is done to hasten invention will pay off for the world movement past the poverty line. There are many stages, from pure scientific investigation to the translation of science into technology, to the engineering that makes a production model out of a working prototype and finally on to parts contracting and the assembly line, and each stage takes time. The U.S., once foremost in the speed with which it could convert knowledge into the production of goods, is said to be losing this preeminence; a slowing down would have bad consequences not only for the American competitive position among industrial nations but also for the world escape from poverty. The need is not confined to scientific and engineering knowledge; prompt solutions are also required of many problems in biology and medicine, climatology and geophysics. The technical and social knowledge for birth control is of special importance; whatever the size of the window through which the poor escape into the middle class, the lowering of births will at least bring closer the day when world poverty ceases to increase in absolute amount.

Some part of American research has been directed specifically to labor-intensive devices suited to poor countries, and that line of investigation ought to be encouraged. Even after the Green Revolution, for example, poor countries still have special agricultural problems. Apart from such specific research, the U.S. helps all countries when it develops the knowledge that makes its own industry more efficient.

A particular preoccupation of the less developed countries is dependency; even commercial indebtedness is seen as neocolonialism. The technical evolution of the poor countries along lines suited to their own needs will be aided by American expansion of knowledge in that it will widen the choice of techniques available to them. In order that any such American contribution not create commercial indebtedness, it would be advisable to place the new knowledge and inventions in the public domain as the common possession of mankind rather than in patents on which royalties could be drawn.

Both production constraints and environmental constraints limit the growth of the world middle class. The way the U.S. can help to open the window is not through schemes for division of the existing product but by contributing knowledge that will expand the product. Solving production and environmental problems starts at home, but any genuine contribution will have value worldwide. Incentives can be devised to direct technology in environment-saving rather than environment-damaging directions. No one can forecast how much time it will take to solve any one technical problem, let alone the complex of problems, but that time — whatever it may be — will be shortened by a larger and more immediate mobilization of scientific and engineering talent.

Hunger and World Order

by Miriam Therese MacGillis, O.P.
and Gerald Mische

Hunger is an issue that has refused to go away. It persists despite bumper harvests; despite two decades of development programs; and despite a flurry of attention by the United Nations, national governments and religious and humanitarian agencies.

Record harvests in some areas of the world have produced over-all global figures showing a 3 percent increase in world food production for 78/79. World grain production was up 6.5 percent within that period and was projected to reach a record of 1.4 billion tons.

But these figures are misleading in several ways:

1. While agricultural output has increased in both developed and developing countries, the greatest gains have been in more developed countries, particularly Western Europe, the USSR and the United States. The total world figures hide the continuing disparities between world regions and sub-regions.

2. While food production in some developing nations has been increasing, the population has grown at a faster rate. Thus, *per capita,* food production for the developing nations as a group has remained about the same and in some countries has actually declined.

3. The total food production figures for a country often camouflage the continuing disparities between rich and poor. In most cases, increased food production for a nation has not alleviated the hunger of the poor within that nation.

Despite bumper harvests and world records in grain production, about 500 million people today suffer the effects of hunger and malnutrition, including brain damage, physical malformations and diseases. Every day, 15,000 men, women and children die of starvation and malnourishment

Poverty and hunger are two sides of one coin. In the less developed world, close to one-half of all the people in the rural areas are impoverished. The number of rural poor has grown by 162 million in the last decade. Despite the rising trend of migration to the cities, these rural poor are expected to increase by another 900 million by the end of the century. The situation in the cities is not much better. Rural poor fleeing to the cities are often met by unemployment. This coupled with the loss of the land they left behind means a double indemnity: the inability to either produce or purchase food.

The causes of poverty and hunger are multiple and interrelated with other issues. They are related, for example, to unbalanced national development strategies, population growth, un-

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employment, food distribution policies, transport systems, dispossession of people from the land and obsolete or poor agrarian practices.

They are also vitally related to the vagaries of an international system ill-equipped to cope with the new realities of a rapidly changing and interdependent world. This monograph analyzes the present world system of competing National-Security States as a major factor in the perpetuation of hunger. It also explores alternatives to that system that would open the way to a resolution of the hunger problem and make the end of hunger a real possibility.

Brazil: Hunger in the Face of an Economic Miracle

We begin by assessing the situation of Brazil. Brazil has been hailed as an economic miracle. Over the last two decades she has experienced an extraordinary rate of agricultural as well as industrial growth. In the 1970's, soybean production in Brazil jumped forty-fold. By 1977, Brazil was second only to the U.S. in soybean production. Brazil produces 70 percent of the world's international trade in concentrated orange juice. She is a major producer of coffee, black beans and sugar.

The irony of Brazil's "miracle" is that it has not improved the nutritional level of the majority of her people, nor is this really expected to happen. The soybeans are intended for cattle consumption in the developed world. The gap between Brazil's G.N.P. and the growing poverty of masses of her people is often overlooked.

Like most developing nations emerging from colonial dependencies and struggling with deficit-ridden economics, Brazil has interpreted "development" according to the strict parameters of the market system. Instead of food production for domestic consumption, land is given to the cultivation of lucrative "cash crops" which are channeled to the markets of affluent elites and nations who can purchase them with precious foreign exchange. With this urgently needed capital, Brazil can balance her trade deficits and fuel her domestic industrial growth.

While some 50 million peasants and subsistence farm families are chronically malnourished, while the urban masses queue up for diminishing doles of black beans, Brazil exports her harvests of black beans. While infant mortality rates testify to the 40% level of malnourishment, Brazil testifies to the cruel choices being made by twentieth century leaders world wide. She also gives witness to the structural dilemmas which have been created by the new global age and which underlie many of those choices.

What is so startling about the case of Brazil is that it is not an isolated exception, but indicative of a trend that — within the present nation-state system — omens little hope for the world's hungry.

Despite all the educational efforts, humanitarian works, and technical assistance, the fact has not changed that this day cattle will be fed enough grain to feed 6 billion persons while the majority of the earth's 4 billion people are hungry. This is simply to state that there is a fundamental gap between the structures we have created for the wellbeing of humankind and their capacity to actually meet those needs.

To a certain degree and in some cases it is possible to link this depressing trend in hunger patterns to apathy or callousness on the part of affluent or government elites. But increasingly it becomes apparent that more than lack of good will is the cause of the problem and it will take more than good will to reverse the trend.

The *global system itself* mitigates against a resolution of world hunger.

Structures or People . . .
National Security System . . .

One of the most formidable obstacles to overcoming world hunger are *structural inadequacies.* Humankind has evolved economic, political and social systems throughout the course of history. At least in theory, they were evolved to cope with the basic material needs and security of people. In spite of the unprecedented knowledge and technological skills we have mastered, one of the greatest ironies to be faced is that *our structures now survive* outside of the control and power of the majority of the human community. The cost of stabilizing present economic and political systems is the wellbeing of over half the world's people.

Hunger, as an enormous problem in itself, is also *a symptom of a more profound problem.* It points to the inadequacy of the presently operative world view — that the security of each person is best provided by some 150 independent, sovereign nation-states, each operating unilaterally, without the constraints of mutually accepted laws, but all dependent on the same finite resources of the planet for the sustenance of life.

As long as the allegiance of national leaders is confined to the people, structures and territory within their national boundaries, the strongest imperative for leaders is to assure the defense of that entity and assure its access to whatever planetary resources are valid to its internal needs. *Mobilization for that national security, in its several implications, is one of the most pervasive causes of world hunger.* What is often overlooked, however, is that national security now goes beyond the previous concepts of guns and armaments. It is now a complex web of other, less obvious, factors.

We will consider three dimensions of national security competition as they affect the problem of hunger: competition over balance of weapons, over balance of payments and over scarce resources.

Balance of Weapons . . .
Guns or Butter . . .

I has become obvious that the highest national expenditures in most societies is for armaments. (In some countries, expenditures for education exceed the military budget.) Currently some $400 billion is being spent annually by national leaders for military purposes. Each year, the amount escalates.

In and of itself, this drains a larger proportion of world-wide capital, natural resources and creative human productivity than any other public expenditure. Less than 1% of world military costs will be allocated to international peace-keeping; and total world economic aid will be under 6% of military expenditures — of which only a part is food aid. Ironically, this pivotal aid could do far more than tanks and missiles to reduce the violent

conditions of poverty, disease and desperation which are major causes of revolution and internal social upheaval.

Thus, a country like Brazil, with urgent social needs, directs enormous amounts of capital to military and police security systems. This priority in military spending is not limited to Brazil, but is rather on the increase throughout Africa, Asia and Latin America. With their enormous domestic social needs, these countries have almost tripled their expenditures for weaponry in the past 15 years. This rate of growth is faster than the economic base supporting it.

Given the *lack of global institutions* with effective authority to protect legitimate national rights, or to arbitrate differences and assure the just resolution of conflict, national leaders have little choice but to arm against the possibility of outside aggression. But the nuclear capability of present armaments has dramatically changed the nature of defense and the possibility of security. The escalating race for military superiority and the constant striving for adequate deterrance has not only made security universally impossible, but has drained public coffers and undermined all other human needs. Food, housing, health care, education, employment, rural development, environmental and other social programs are increasingly being subordinated to military expenditures in most nations around the world.

Military costs not only deplete national budgets of money needed for food related programs, but in many poorer countries which purchase sophisticated modern weapons from abroad, it contributes to balance of payments deficits that threaten a nation's economic survival. This in turn has led food producing poorer nations to *export* food in order to alleviate the deficit. The hungry poor receive a triple whammy from this policy:

1. It creates a domestic food scarcity and inflation, driving up local food prices beyond the reach of the poor.

2. Rising military imports mean less monies available for food, agricultural and other programs to alleviate the plight of the hungry.

3. The guns and weapons so procured are often turned against the poor when they protest their situation and cry for reforms or revolution.

In many Third World countries, leaders — fearing the demands of the poor majority for legitimate land reform and more equitable distribution of resources — increase military expenditures to assure internal order and maintain their position of dominance and privilege. Sophisticated police weaponry and methods of interrogation, elaborate intelligence systems and support of right wing terrorists organizations sap the resources of the poor as well as they preserve the status quo of the elites who continue to exploit them. There is no effective world law to protect a people from such illegitimate use of force and domination. "National security" in these instances is a phrase easily manipulated to maintain and rationalize the need for control. It becomes a Machiavellian euphemism for continuing oppression.

Growing hunger is a domestic problem of developed countries as well. In the United States, for example, both urban and rural poor people spend increasingly higher percentages of their limited income for food. Many federal assistance programs have already been cut back and vital services such as Meals on Wheels are threatened with serious cutbacks. Elderly people who rely heavily on such vital programs are victims of the cutbacks — part of the "cost of war." To the poor of Detroit, Newark, Baltimore or Milwaukee, inflation means a slow stunting of development, a slow decline in nourishment. For every federal dollar paid by a city such as Newark, only 12¢ comes back in the form of resources and services. Newark leads the nation in infant mortality, unemployment and urban crime. It boasts the lowest level of literacy and health care. Yet Newark still pays 55¢ out of every federal tax dollar for security against outside aggression.

Relief programs such as those of CROP, UNICEF, Care and the whole gamut of humanitarian organizations working in the private sector, are caught in the same dilemma. Not only has federal assistance for grain purchase been cut back, but inflation — which is a global problem needing global solutions — saps the constant effort to sustain public interest with persistent pleas to give and give and give again.

One major cost of maintaining the balance of weapons is hunger.

Balance of Payments . . .
Transistors or Bread . . .

In our recent history, national security has become more complex than the struggle to avoid nuclear self-destruction. A whole new web of post-war economic and monetary interdependencies has exposed the vulnerability of all nation-states.

Lacking effective global institutions to deal with these dependencies, the world has witnessed a rising monetary instability that has made the phrase "balance of payments" a household word for anyone reading daily papers or listening to radio or TV news broadcasts. This growing crisis of balance of payments has a direct relationship to the problem of hunger.

Without a supranational authority to assure multilateralism and justice in international economic relations, countries — rich or poor, capitalist or socialist — must avoid a chronic deficit in international monetary reserve of gold and foreign currency. Sustained deficits in a nation's balance-of-payments undermine the viability of its currency, threatening its domestic scene with inflation, unemployment and societal breakdown.

For many countries, balance-of-payment deficits are greater threats to national security than are threats from military intervention.

If a nation opts for a development model that will permit them to purchase and compete with other nation states for products and resources essential to industrial development (such as oil), they need foreign currency. Unless they are willing and able to sell some of their own products in the world marketplace they will not have foreign reserves. National institutions and resources, therefore, are mobilized to produce goods and commodities that are marketable overseas — i.e., goods capable of bringing in the foreign reserves needed to offset monetary deficits.

Thus, in many poor nations, fertile, productive land that could produce food to feed its people is diverted to the production of *cash crops* for export. In Kenya, for example, vast areas of arable land is used to grow tea and coffee, a prime source of foreign monetary reserves. In Egypt, the focus is on the cash crop of cotton. This shift to cash crops has diverted the basic food self-sufficiency of many village regions to dependency on food imports. For others it has led to chronic malnutrition.

In Peru, where fishing once provided protein for domestic

consumption, the need to offset balance of payments deficits has shifted the benefits of the anchovy industry from the people of Peru to the cattle of Europe and North America.

Haiti, with one of the poorest rural populations, is using prime fertile land to produce sugar, coffee and cocoa, all headed for the ports of the industrialized world. In the Philippines, hundreds of thousands of acres are devoted to pineapple production for American corporations and their customers in the affluent world. Meanwhile, Filipinos suffer one of the world's highest infant mortality rates — a direct effect of chronic malnourishment.

Mexico is steadily increasing its production of vegetables and fruits, primarily for the United States. (In 1977, the U.S. imported more than 780 million pounds of tomatoes, an increase of 150 million pounds from 1970.) Carrots, cucumbers and strawberries are also raised for export.

There are new and powerful alliances between Mexican leaders and U.S. agribusiness and both benefit from these exports. Lacking many industrial products to sell, Mexico can earn precious currency from her agricultural exports. This in turn enables her to buy manufactured goods and technical services. U.S. Agribusiness is happy to use Mexican land and labor for the profit and growth inherent in the arrangement.

However, the import trade flowing into U.S. supermarkets enters into direct competition with the same products grown by U.S. farmers, resulting in declining domestic production. U.S. farmers feel forced to abandon the diversified agriculture they once practiced. Many are either selling their farms to agribusiness or are being diverted by market forces to grain production. Since grains are a primary export crop of the U.S. and strategic for offsetting U.S. trade and payments deficits, there is more security in grain production. Thus Mexican vegetable producers and U.S. grain producers have a common national security function. They produce export crops that enable both countries to offset their monetary deficits and import essential commodities.

Of course, some of the developing nations could forego a Western industrial development model and choose instead a food self-sufficiency model in which food production within their nation is kept for domestic consumption. But most want access to some of the benefits of Western technology and tools which they now lack and which, at least initially, they must import until their own capacity for industrial production has been sufficiently developed. And some nations, due to geographic conditions, (such as semi-desert areas) cannot grow sufficient food of enough nutritional variety for their own population. They depend on the export of other resources at just prices so that they have enough foreign reserves to purchase food in the world marketplace.

Balance of payments deficits also affect policies of the so called "developed" nations. As the international monetary system established at Bretton Woods in 1944 began to break down in the mid-1960's under the strains and pressures of growing global interdependence, the United States started to experience grave balance of payment deficits. These deficits began to have a strong influence on U.S. foreign policy on two major levels: food policy and armament sales. For the sale of grains and arms are the two major sources of foreign reserves for the United States — i.e., its prime rectifiers of balance of payment deficits.

There is a direct relationship between the demands of

market viability and the consequent subsidizing and threatening growth of multinational agribusiness. It must be faced with sober realism that planet earth is slowly being "purchased" by a centralized agricultural system, whose power and control is largely unregulated and little understood. In country after country, and indeed within the United States, the spectre of displaced farmers and peasants forced to urban centers is a direct manipulation of economic and political elites. While on the one hand, greed and power fan the human injustice of such a phenomena, on the other hand, the lawlessness of the global market legitimates it.

E.F. Schumacher's "small is beautiful" scenario may have proven that smaller units of labor-intensive agriculture are more efficient than the capital-intensive models of agribusiness. But "small is beautiful" cannot hold a candle to the organizational ability of agribusiness which enables it to finance, produce, cultivate, package and transport large quantities of food for the *world* market thereby assuring a nation of large quantities of foreign currency to offset balance of payments deficits.

The United States produces a greater percentage of the world's exportable grain than the OPEC nations produce of the world's exportable oil. Former U.S. Secretary of Agricultural Butz said that food reserves were a powerful weapon in the diplomatic arsenal of the United States. In 1978, U.S. farm exports totalled $27.3 billion and contributed $13.5 billion to the U.S. trade balance. These sales went primarily to the USSR, China, Japan and Western and Eastern Europe. They were not only designed to assure the policy of detente with the Soviet Union or improve U.S. foreign policy; they also assured large quantities of precious foreign currency for the U.S. who has been suffering a trade deficit and decline in the value of the dollar. Sales at concessionary prices to poorer countries who are unable to pay competitive market prices would substantially undercut this balance of payments benefit.

The "right to food" question has special urgency for those developing nations whose economics and foreign reserves have been devastated by OPEC increases in oil prices. Many are unable to compete in the market for food and/or for the fertilizer and technology needed to expand their food production. Lacking effective world order institutions — based on principles of economic equity and social justice — which could provide these nations with access to foreign reserves, access to capital and trade preferences, millions of their citizens are denied that basic right to food.

The road to developing a *World Food Authority* empowered to deal with food apart from inflexible market forces and apart from imperatives of national security policy will not be traveled overnight. But the conceptualization at the Rome Food Conference of such an authority and of the "right to food" was an important first step.

The second rectifier of balance of payments deficits, arms sales, has escalated since the quadrupling of oil prices in 1973. These deficits forced Western European nations — many of which are dependent upon OPEC for up to 80% of their oil — to join in the race to peddle arms to Third World countries as a source of foreign reserves. Such peddling — often facilitated by bribery from the coffers of armament manufacturers — means that many of the buyer countries have less capital and foreign reserves available for expansion of their agricultural sector. In-

deed, the relationship between arms sales and balance of payments goals is so lucrative that even some Third World countries, e.g., India, have developed their own export industry of small arms.

This points up to the "transistors or bread" dilemma quite explicitly. Much has been said of the tragic results of the imitation by Third World nations of the Western development model of capital-intensive, urban based industry; and how this imitation has caused grave neglect of agricultural development. Not enough attention, however, has been given to the role that balance of payments goals have had as a criterion for following this development model.

Lacking a World Monetary Authority to deal adequately and justly with legitimate foreign reserve problems, national leaders have little choice but to give first priority to producing not food but what sells in the world market — transistors, armaments or whatever.

At the same time, it cannot be overemphasized that the profiteering motive of exploitive political and economic elites is only legitimated and promoted by this national security imperative. It is a destructive cycle that feeds upon itself and anticipates no substantial equalizer on the horizon.

Resources For All? . . .

While considering the security imperative of balance of weapons and payments, it is also important to consider the security imperatives of scarce resources competition.

On a planet of material limitations, security is virtually tied up with resource availability. The scramble for fossil fuels, minerals, uranium, fresh water and arable land not only diverts capital to the futile search for self-sufficiency, but also creates a web of military alliances cutting across political and ideological lines.

U.S. grain production — about 240 million tons in 1977 — has become a powerful diplomatic tool in this national security competition over scarce resources. The use of the "Food for Peace" program by the United States in its national security strategies — i.e., providing grain to those nations complying with U.S. foreign policy objectives rather than to those nations in most critical need of food assistance — bears witness to the national security role of the Department of Agriculture during the late 60's and early 70's.

Congressional action in 1976 imposed more stringent guidelines on the use of food, directing that it be used more for humanitarian than political purposes. But with oil price increases continuing to erode the U.S. balance of payments, the U.S. Department of Agriculture has continued to serve as a key national security vehicle, with U.S. wheat exports a cornerstone of economic security. One U.S. congressman even made the suggestion, in all seriousness, that the price of a barrel of U.S. wheat should be pegged to the cost of a barrel of OPEC oil.

Lacking a *world security system* that could assure an equitable distribution of the world's scarce resources, most nations are giving heavy priority to "energy independence." In the United States, this is spelled out in terms of tens of billions of dollars allocated — directly and indirectly — to energy related industries rather than to programs designed to resolve unmet human needs such as housing, health care, hunger, care for the elderly, etc.

Similarly Third World countries also are dominated by a drive to modernize their economics toward "energy independence." Hundreds of millions of dollars in scarce capital are being paid to multinational corporations with the technology to exploit their untapped natural resources in search of energy sources or to construct costly nuclear plants.

Water, rural agricultural development, land reform, irrigation, transportation, storage and other aspects of domestic food production take a back seat to this energy mobilization.

Added to this frustration is the danger posed to health, and future production by increasing dependence on nuclear power as an alternative to oil imports. Present and future radioactive emissions into the soil, air and water due to faulty equipment, accidents and inadequate waste disposal from nuclear energy production enter the food chain and threaten healthy food supplies for present and future generations.

The irony is that even if the U.S. were to achieve energy independence by the 1990's it would still be vulnerable in regard to many other resources for which it relies on other nations. Lester Brown describes this growing dependency:

"Of the 13 basic industrial raw materials required by a modern economy, the United States in 1950 was dependent on imports for more than one-half of its supplies of four — aluminum, manganese, nickel and tin. By 1970 the list had increased to six as zinc and chromium were added . . . Projections by the Department of the Interior indicate that by 1985 the United States will depend on imports for more than one-half of its supplies of nine basic raw materials — as iron, lead and tungsten are added to the list. By the end of the century, our country will depend on foreign sources for more than half of its supplies of each of the 13 raw materials except phosphate."

One result of this growing dependency is the "aluminum security" that Brazil can provide U.S. corporations. The price for the U.S. is to cooperate with a military dictatorship which violates the basic democratic principles professed by the constitution and the citizens of the United States. While military and economic assistance has been cut by the Carter administration over human rights abuses in Brazil, U.S. dependency on Brazilian aluminum deposits continues to foster large U.S. investments in mining the Amazon jungle.

Beyond political questions is the human cost. Indigenous people have been uprooted from their natural habitat. Their source of food and sustenance, is the tradeoff for technological development and the scramble for resources. In just one decade of mining and logging ventures in Brazil's Amazon interior, the native Indian population has dropped from over 3 million persons to less than 200,000. Hunger, disease, disorientation and the uprooting of their traditional values and culture,have cost these tribal people their possible survival. It is a high cost for resource security.

In a world of growing interdependence, of growing appetite for consumer goods and of increasing consumption of energy and resources, mobilization for competition for the earth's finite resources has become a logical priority of national leaders of rich and poor nations alike.

Here we are dealing with the reality of a *lawless global arena.* The rules of access and demand are made by those with the

power to enforce them. Without a *world security system* to regulate the military, monetary and resource competition of our interdependent world, there is a logic by which leaders sacrifice many human priorities to policies designed to ensure necessary resources.

An Analogy . . .

The "security straitjacket" which is impacting against a resolution of problems such as hunger can perhaps best be viewed through an analogy using the United States.

If the 50 States were no longer united under a federal system but were instead 50 "sovereign" and independent nations, each having to provide their own security against the possible aggression of the other nation-states, and if at the same time that they were building up their defense systems they had to negotiate with the other sovereignties to meet basic needs, the situation might not be much different than it is in the world system of today where over 150 "sovereignties" compete for military and economic survival.

The "sovereign" countries of California and Florida would be rich in fruits and vegetables (barring droughts and unusual freezes.) The Mid-Western "nations" on the Great Plains would be rich in grains. The "countries" of the Northeast would be relatively food-poor for their large populations, but rich in industrial products. Some of the Southwestern "nations" would be rich in oil and gas.

If these same "nations" put their faith in "national" sovereignty alone and were unwilling to invest some of their sovereignty in inter-state cooperation and a higher level of government to ensure their shared security, they would be in the unfortunate situation of each state having to give priority to military expenditures to ensure safety from possible attack by the other 49. Although military alliances would develop, nations would fear to rely solely on these because of a history of broken treaties. Meanwhile the quality of life — from spiritual and psychological as well as physical and material perspectives — would be undermined.

While maintaining a watchful eye against military advantage, these "sovereignties" would also keep an eye out for economic threats. If the Northeastern "sovereignties" imported too much grain and other foodstuffs but did not export sufficient shoes, fabrics, clothing, machinery, etc. at an advantageous price, they would lack the "foreign reserves" needed to pay for future food imports. The value of their currencies would decline and their economies begin to dwindle.

The problem of scarce resources — such as oil — would take on crisis proportions for many of these states if the Southwestern "nations" decided to stop "exports" to the cold Northern "countries." Mobilization for resource independence would radically alter priorities in "nations" such as New Jersey, New York and Connecticut, who would need to make alternative energy sources a matter of grave "national security."

The problems underscored in this analogy are further compounded in the world of nation-states as they exist in the real world of today when one realizes that many of the developing nations are much smaller than the state of California and lack the geographic diversity and agricultural potential of California.

Futher, in this lawless world, where each sovereignty is a law unto itself, the people of many nations are at the mercy of dictatorships and powerful elites who have no higher accountability than the laws they themselves establish to protect their power and extend their control. Meanwhile, millions may be left landless while a few wealthy elites control food production and distribution. Or, lacking fair return for their labor, they have not the means to buy the food at the inflated prices charged them. Either way, they are the hungry victims of an unjust system unregulated and unaccountable to higher law.

The task before us is to develop a moral maturity and political will to elect and motivate national leaders who can begin to replace the obsolete structures based on unlimited national sovereignty with structures capable of dealing with global realities too large for national control.

It is a formidable task. It demands that we call forth accountability within present structures, however inadequate they are. But more important, it demands that we question seriously the time-hallowed assumptions that underlie our notions of "progress," "development" and "civilization." A revolution (more accurately, a "provolution") must occur in our inner vision. The issue of *humanness* in development must finally be placed on the agenda of the human community. A new vision and ethic for meaning as well as for survival must be at the heart of the structural change so necessary.

Structures For People . . .
A World Security System . . .

"The question is not one of 'surrendering' national sovereignty. The problem is not negative and does not involve giving up something we already have. The problem is positive — creating something we lack, but that we imperatively need."

Emery Reves

The multiple global crises — of which hunger is only one and with which hunger is inescapably interlocked -- that confront us on every side are substantially rooted in the obsolescence of a system based upon the principle of *unlimited* national sovereignty. The new interdependent world is one in which *actual* sovereignty has become a myth: as unregulated global military, monetary and economic forces devastate domestic priorities and undermine humanistic, person-centered values.

Security — personal as well as national — is gravely threatened in such a lawless arena. What is needed is a *world* security system of global institutions commensurate to the interlocking crises of today's interdependent world. Such a system can loosen the straitjacket of constant military, monetary and resource mobilization which are preventing nations from putting human needs and social justice, for their citizens and for all of humankind, as priorities on their agendas. It is also an essential link for regaining personal and citizen control over the rising threat of centralized political domination.

The world security system that is suggested for consideration is not a centralized "world government." It is, rather, a *central guidance system* of functional institutions with that limited authority needed to deal — according to the principles of social justice — with those problems which individual nations cannot resolve by themselves.

Central to such a world security system would be the *prin-*

ciple of subsidiarity, applied within a world legal framework. Subsidiarity begins with the proposition that decision-making should be made at the lowest possible level. Only when problems cannot be managed and justice cannot be achieved at the local municipal, state or national levels, are effective juridical institutions needed at the global level.

World Food Council . . .

The *World Food Council,* proposed at the UN Food Conference in Rome, conceptualizes an example of a *functional* world order institution. The World Food Council is an important global creation, symbolizing a cooperative effort to deal with a global crisis and concretizing an embryonic structure that could be empowered to deal authoritatively with food as an inalienable right of humankind.

It would be helpful here to consider the activities of the World Food Council, and to assess its present effectiveness in implementing programs aimed at long-range structural change. The Council has three major areas of activity:

1. *Increased Food Production* aimed at eventual food sufficiency and development of the rural poor in as many developing nations as possible.

2. *A Food Security System* as an intermediate measure to assure adequate reserves of food for times of disaster, market glut or crop shortfall, strengthened by an early warning system to prepare for times of probable disaster.

3. *Food Aid* as a stop-gap measure for assuring victims of hunger the essential nutrition needed for survival and as payment for food/work programs.

All three areas of activity are simultaneously evolving and are equally important if serious development is to be made in providing the opportunities for people to be assured of physical sustenance. Yet when we begin to probe into the functional design of these three areas, we begin to see how national sovereignty still poses major obstacles to the degree of progress really needed.

A Strategy For System Change

by Robert C. Johansen

1. Design

A movement for a more appropriate security system can begin among concerned individuals on all continents of the world. The suggestions below apply to U.S. citizens. In other societies complementary actions should be designed to take into consideration local cultural and political conditions. Those leading the effort might be called planetary citizens, defined simply as people who live according to the understanding that politically, ecologically, and morally their well-being and that of their nation are inseparable from the rest of humanity. To assure a system change of global proportions, the movement must be transnational, committed to abolition of the warfare system, and dedicated to firm, nonviolent, citizen action. It would be unwise for such a movement to adopt the idea that a few revolutionaries can or should seize power for themselves in order to usher in a new age. Until there has been wide-spread attitudinal change, there would be insufficient political support for a humane implementation of the desired changes in institutions, even in the unlikely event that one could capture power.

If concerned individuals and groups make intense efforts to educate and organize for a demilitarized planet, it might be possible within the next twenty-five years to have a process well underway to abolish the war system. Although it is impossible to predict the pace at which changes may occur, for analytical convenience we can distinguish five different stages, each of five years duration, for building an appropriate security system:

Phase One: The first five years include vigorous educational and lobbying activities to raise public consciousness and to begin changing government priorities. The balance of political forces in the United States and several other states, where there is already dissatisfaction with wasteful military spending, turns against the perpetuation of the arms buildup.

Phase Two: The United States, the Soviet Union, and many other states commit themselves to annual reductions in military expenditures. These continue throughout the remaining phases. They are coupled to some particular force reductions and a pledge to stop the testing and deployment of all new strategic delivery systems and warheads. A world security organization, whether entirely new or based upon a remodeled United Nations, verifies reductions. National means for verification could also continue.

Phase Three: Both the United States and the Soviet Union move to a minimal nuclear deterrent. Annual budget reductions continue. All middle-range powers are brought within the system of verified, military cutbacks.

Phase Four: Budget cuts proceed at a quickened pace of 20 percent each year. By the end of this stage the nuclear powers dismantle their remaining nuclear weapons. All fissionable materials are regulated by a global authority. Any small states not yet participating are brought into the phased arms reductions.

Phase Five: Conventional arms reductions continue. At the end of this phase military spending and production are permanently prohibited. The global security organization, previously in place, prevents any effort at rearmament.

2. Regular Reductions of Military Budgets

This strategy makes budget cuts, coupled with subsequent ceilings for specific weapons systems, the central feature of the disarming process.[1] In the long run, military expenditures provide a useful general measure of military capability. Budget reductions restrict a total military effort more effectively than agreements on single weapons systems.

A second merit of this approach is the high degree of flexibility that budget restrictions allow. Participating governments

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may select the precise mix of forces that they need. Land-locked states, for example, might want to retain far different residual forces during the transition than would sea powers. In short, budgetary reductions provide the most comprehensive yet flexible approach to arms reductions.

Moreover, the budgetary approach is attractive because of its simplicity — an essential quality in selecting the most effective strategy for public education, political mobilization, and legislative lobbying. The public may lack time and information to unravel the complexities of whether the United States should have 1320 MIRV's or only 1000, but the public can insist on a 10 percent reduction in expenditures each year.

One problem with this approach is the difficulty of verifying reductions. Obviously, many military expenditures could be made without including the items explicitly in a public budget. As a result, verification of budget cuts will depend upon a global monitoring system that would, through use of satellite surveillance, electronic telecommunication, and other means, make an annual estimate of the expenditures of each nation. Equivalent monetary values would be assigned to comparable components in each state's equipment and military forces, and an overall estimate then made.[2] Because states occasionally would dispute the figures for their own or a rival's expenditures, the agency monitoring expenditures should provide opportunity for presentation of evidence by an interested national government, perhaps from its own intelligence estimates. The final judgment about expenditure levels would have to reside with the global authority, similar to a court of last resort in domestic legal proceedings. With appropriate efforts and the use of advanced technology for monitoring, the problems of verification could be overcome.

3. Phase One: Changing Consciousness

At the outset, persons interested in building planetary community will seek to enlist and energize existing religious and civic organizations for study and political action. Inspired by a heightened sense of human solidarity, people in this modern abolitionist movement will commit themselves to replacing the institutions of war with a new system of peace. They will build a broad coalition to bring the question of major arms reductions to the top of the nation's political agenda. Farsighted and morally sensitive persons now in the ranks of youth groups, environmentalists, feminists, civil rights workers, peace activists, labor leaders, business people, farm workers, churches and synagogues, political parties, and professional organizations will all be involved.

Members will first encourage people to begin thinking about a new image of security. The old idea is that security depends upon military prowess and a government's ability to protect a given piece of *territory*. The new image of security will emphasize the well-being of the world's *people* and the *planet*. Planetary citizens will promote public debate centered on the idea that serving the needs of humanity, not merely of nation or class, should become a principal standard for making decisions. The security of the human race, for example, is related as much to ozone density or to a dependable supply of food and energy as to control over a national segment of territory. Because of the broader, more humane image of security, the movement will seek to implement the following four values as an expression of the global human interest: peace without national military arsenals, economic well-being for all, basic human rights and social justice, and ecological balance.

Territorial discrimination — that is, discrimination against a group of persons because of the territory in which they happen to live — will be recognized as the modern equivalent of age-old racial discrimination. People will understand that letting political boundaries determine who will receive food or petroleum or napalm or fallout is like letting racial lines determine who must sit in the back of the bus.

During Phase One, candidates for public office will be asked to commit themselves to the program of initiatives listed below under Phase Two and published in a globalist platform. If they do not support these or similar policies, they will be actively opposed by planetary citizens. Legislative initiatives within as many national arenas as possible will be supported to implement the drive for an alternative security system. Within the United States, Congress should be encouraged to halt the deployment of new weapons and to freeze or to begin reducing military expenditures.

In affluent societies, committed individuals will contribute financial resources to consciousness-raising efforts, and, if politically feasible, to an endowment for establishing a standing, transnational enforcement agency. Some persons will refuse military conscription and resist war taxes. In addition, many members will learn the techniques of nonviolent resistance. This capability will help (1) to keep the movement nonviolent even when direct action may be useful, (2) to serve as a check upon the anticipated world security organization to prevent it from performing arbitrary acts, and (3) to increase the capacity to provide security as the disarmament process proceeds.[3]

4. Phase Two: Reducing Military Expenditures and Verifying Reductions

4.1. Budget reductions. As soon as the planetary citizens movements has mobilized sufficient political strength in the United States, the U.S. government will announce its intention to build an alternative security system. Toward that end, it also will commit itself to cut military expenditures annually by 10 percent. It will ask the Soviet Union to reciprocate. Even if the Soviet Union at first does not, the cuts can be safely undertaken and probably should be continued for three successive years.

Why should reductions occur without Soviet reciprocation? First of all, it will take time for a military rival to believe in the seriousness of the announced reductions. Several years may be required for Soviet "doves" to mobilize enough support within the Soviet Union to reverse present Soviet military policies. Three years would allow other countries to take the planetary movement seriously and to lobby the Soviet government to alter its priorities. Time is needed for reluctant governments to witness the economic advantages present in a society no longer burdened by increasing military expenditures.

In addition, several years of an arms reversal program would be required for those governments supporting the new initiatives to establish transnational verification and preliminary enforcement agencies. These agencies' effective operations and their obvious refusal to become instruments of any single nation state would provide some reassurance to governments at first re-

luctant to join in arms reductions.

Moreover, based on the budget data compiled by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute,[4] the United States could cut its expenditures by 10 percent for two years without even reducing them to the present level of Soviet spending. If one prefers the estimates by observers who place Soviet expenditures at a somewhat higher level,[5] U.S. reductions could not occur without moving below Soviet military appropriations, but the gap would not be large enough to be destabilizing.

Three years of reductions would not jeopardize U.S. security even within the present international system based on military prowess. The cuts proposed here would enable the United States to retain a nuclear deterrent capable of assured destruction of the Soviet Union until *after* full Soviet participation. Because the present U.S. deterrent force includes substantial overkill, even a 90 percent reduction in deliverable warheads still would leave the United States with more than *twice* the number of strategic weapons necessary to destroy the 240 Soviet cities over 100,000 people.[6] Even if the Soviet Union possessed many more warheads than the United States *and* launched a first strike, it could not prevent the destruction of its own society.

Of course, cutting the budget by a given percentage each year would *not* mean cutting strategic weapons by an identical percentage. The size of weapons reductions would depend upon the particular mix of strategic weapons, tactical weapons, troops, and other conventional forces that the President, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Congress might choose.

4.2. Arms reductions. Budgetary cutbacks should be accompanied by some explicitly announced reductions of specific weapons. The budget cuts will then carry more precise meaning and communicate clearer intent to reverse the arms buildup. The following procedure probably would be the most efficient means for implementing such reductions. The United States or another country could announce a specific arms reduction at the time it is made. Like the continuing budget cuts, an arms reduction would occur without specific diplomatic negotiations preceding it. *Afterwards,* the precedent-setting state should seek to transform its own initiative into a legal obligation for other states.

4.3. The politics of reductions. In considering specific arms reductions, there is no magic formula for calculating what should be done first. But, in general, these guidelines apply:

1. Any given reduction by a national government should *precede* the effort to universalize the reduction through conclusion of a formal treaty.

2. Once written, a treaty establishing a new norm for restricting arms should take effect immediately among those nations ratifying it. Norms would then begin to take shape under the influence of the most progressive states, rather than be the product of the lowest common denominator of agreement.

3. Verification of each reduction should be carried out by a global agency, which could include representatives of states not at first agreeing to the reduction.

Phase Two would not end nor Phase Three begin until both the United States and Soviet Union were participating in regular budget cutbacks.

5. Phase Three: Adopting a Minimal Deterrent, and Broadening Participation

Phase Three could begin with the United States adopting a minimum deterrent posture, defined as the smallest number of strategic nuclear weapons required to inflict unacceptable damage upon potential opponents. Because the basis for deterrence would remain, both superpowers could move to a minimum deterrent without being forced to make rapid, fundamental shifts in their strategic doctrines.

Middle-range powers would be encouraged to join the process of annual budget reductions as soon as possible. Many states would favor making budget reductions universal soon after the superpowers' cuts were underway. Japan, which has made relatively few such expenditures since World War II, would probably support the idea. U.S. allies like the United Kingdom would probably also agree. Soviet allies would follow Moscow's lead. Many other states, such as the Netherlands, Canada, Yugoslavia, Mexico, and some Scandinavian countries have traditionally supported arms reductions. Budget cuts might be combined with gradually expanding demilitarized zones throughout the territories of medium powers.

Toward the end of Phase Three, expenditures of the United States and the Soviet Union would have decreased to a point where they were approaching equivalency with the outlays of the middle-range powers like China, the United Kingdom, the Federal Republic of Germany, France, and Iran. As soon as the expenditures of any non-complying state equaled the diminishing budgets of the United States and the Soviet Union, the non-participating country would be *required* to reduce military outlays at the community-established pace. A combination of economic incentives and diplomatic pressure probably would induce other states to comply with phased reductions. If they did not, they would face economic and diplomatic sanctions. Since the governments implementing the cuts would want to enforce the budgetary reductions on others, there would be a reasonable prospect that such sanctions would be imposed.

6. Phase Four: Accelerating Reductions

The goals of the fourth stage will be (1) to increase the pace of budget reductions to 20 percent each year, (2) to insure that all reductions are verified with increasing precision, (3) to strengthen the previously established global agency for enforcing reductions so that no complying state may reverse its direction and rearm, (4) to dismantle all remaining nuclear weapons, (5) to bring all non-complying states into the process and to arrange equitable political representation of all societies in global organizations for peaceful settlement, and (6) to prevent wars during the critical stage of transition to a new security system. Let us examine each of these briefly.

Once all the major powers have joined the process of phased budget reductions, the pace should proceed as quickly as it is possible to make internal economic adjustments to lower military expenditures. During the dismantling of national arsenals verification of each year's reductions will be very important. Fortunately, Phases Two and Three would have provided opportunities to reduce suspiciousness and to develop effective means for inspection well before it would be necessary to be precise in assuring that one state did not gain a slight edge over another state's coercive capacity.

During Phase Four the world security organization,

supported by the major attitudinal and political changes of previous phases, would acquire the authority to prevent changes of previous phases, would acquire the authority to prevent individual officials, scientists, or industrial managers from rearming or evading the guidelines set for budgetary and force reductions. If, for example, a state cut its budget by only 5 percent rather than the agreed upon 20 percent, the world security organization would initiate enforcement action through court proceedings established to handle such disputes. If the court decided the state was delinquent, global marshals might enter the country to close a factory or weapons research center in order to bring the country within the prescribed guidelines. If the government of the offending state interferred with such enforcement, the country would be subjected to economic and political sanctions. In addition, the world security organization would use the transnational peace force to patrol the country's borders, to enforce a total embargo, and perhaps to take other measures to prevent national rearmament. Planetary citizens groups might also encourage labor strikes and civil disobedience by citizens who lived within the offending state. These acts could be aimed both at stopping war production and promoting political change within the country.

Nuclear weapons remaining in national arsenals should be dismantled during this time, and all fissionable materials should be controlled by a global agency to prevent any possible misuse or theft. Taking this step would be politically feasible because for approximately the ten preceding years the superpowers will have conducted no weapons tests, deployed no new weapons, reduced their military budgets, and adjusted to a minimal deterrent. Indeed, by this time a nuclear deterrent may begin to appear superfluous. Conventional arms will remain in Phase Four, although in reduced numbers due to the continually dwindling military budgets, in order to permit a gradual transition away from the war system.

With good reason, smaller states might fear that their interests would be jeopardized by great power collaboration during the transition to a new system, much as they have been in the past. To avoid this result, a vigorous effort would need to be made to insure that plans for phased reductions were a product of equitable participation by all societies of the world.

As the military instrument declined in importance for resolving conflict in world society, there would be a corresponding increase in the need to have dependable means for achieving peaceful change. Organizational structures for this have been discussed elsewhere and need not be repeated here.[9] At the least, such structures must provide for equitable, global representation that gives heavy weight to the world's distribution of population and productivity. Surely the organization should not limit representation exclusively to national governments. Transnational economic organizations, professional and labor groups, and some representatives chosen directly by the people should all be included. Where peaceful settlement can be handled by regional rather than global institutions, the former will be encouraged to manage the conflicts.

To avoid jeopardizing the progress of the movement to a new system, the prevention of war during the fourth phase will be extremely important. For the following reasons, the world security organization should be successful in peacekeeping:

- Most rival states would be reducing their arms at roughly equivalent levels, thus making it unlikely that one state could hope for sufficiently superior forces to yield certain victory. Without that assurance governments would be unlikely to initiate wars.
- Surprise attacks would be less likely because global monitors would report not only military expenditures but also deployment and location of forces.
- The transnational police force would be available at all times to patrol borders and maintain buffer zones in trouble spots.
- With limits on expenditures and various kinds of equipment, intense arms races would be unlikely.
- Improved, transnational political organs for facilitating peaceful change would offer more dependable, nonviolent means for grievance settlement.
- Some border disputes and political conflicts would diminish in intensity and importance as the expectation of war declined. For example, Israel presumably would be less fearful about who occupied the Golan Heights if the capacity to wage war was being abolished. There would be no need to fight a war *now* in order to be in a strong position to defend oneself in a future war.

7. Phase Five: Prohibiting National Military Arsenals

Budget cuts will continue at a minimum of 20 percent per year until the end of Phase Five when military expenditures and residual national forces would be completely abolished. A permanent prohibition on military spending and the production or possession of military weapons would come into force. (Equipment required for law enforcement by authorized local, national, and global officials would remain legal.)

Once weapons are prohibited, of course, war prevention would be much easier because no state would possess the capability to engage in war. Any effort to rearm would be stopped immediately by the world security organization and its enforcement officers. Disputes would be settled through either bilateral negotiations or regional and global organizations for peaceful settlement.

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[1]Budget cuts have been discussed between the United States and the Soviet Union for at least two decades. The two governments even undertook unilateral, parallel reductions of their bugets and withdrew a small number of troops from Europe in 1963 and 1964. This initial, modest step toward reductions by mutual example was reversed in late 1964 and 1965 when U.S. outlays increased to fight the war in Vietnam. See UNA/USA National Policy Panel on Conventional Arms control (fn. 20), p. 18.

[2]Private groups already make relatively reliable estimates based on public information. An official transnational group publicly charged with this responsibility could make even more accurate calculations if it could field its own aerial reconnaissance and research teams. Examples of data published annually by independent organizations include Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, *World Armaments and Disarmament, SIPRI Yearbook* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press); Ruth Leger Sivard, *World Military and Social Expenditures* (Leesburg, VA: WMSE Publications); International Institute for Strategic Studies, *The Military Balance* (London:IISS).

[3]Gene Sharp has described the unrealized political power flowing from nonviolent direct action in *The Politics of Nonviolent Action* (Boston: Porter Sargent, 1973).

[4]*SIPRI Yearbook, 1977* (fn. 0), p. 223.

[5]U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, *World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers, 1966-75* (Washington, D.C.: Government Print-

ing Office, 1977), pp. 47, 51; Sivard (fn. 4), p. 21. Sivard comments on different ways of calculating Soviet expenditures, p. 31.

[8]This statement is based on the very conservative military assumption that the U.S. should target two warheads for each Soviet city to be destroyed. Some officials claim this is desirable because not all U.S. warheads would survive enroute, due to misfiring of launchers, targeting errors, or Soviet anti-missile missiles. If "only" *one* warhead were targeted for each Soviet city, a 90 percent reduction of the U.S. strategic arsenal would leave the United States with *four times* the number of warheads required for destruction of Soviet metropolitan areas over 100,000 people. These figures *exclude* the approximately 7,000 U.S. tactical nuclear weapons now in Europe.

[9]See, for example, Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (New York: Free Press, 1976), especially Chapters 4 and 5; Richard A. Falk and Cyril E. Black (eds.), *The Future of the International Legal Order* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969), Vols. 1 and 4 (especially Donald W. McNemar, "The Future Role of International Institutions," pp. 448-79); Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *The Strategy of World Order; The United Nations*, Vol. 3 (New York: World Law Fund, 1966), Chapters 8 and 9; Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *Introduction to World Peace Through World Law* (Chicago: World Without War Publications, 1973).

Human Development And The "Security Straitjacket"

by Gerald and Patricia Mische

It is now quite clear that the actualization of the highest human potentials is possible — on a mass basis — only under 'good conditions.' Or more directly, good human beings will generally need a good society in which to grow.

By Good Society I mean ultimately one species, one world.

A.H. Maslow

If there is anything in the midst of today's forebodings about the future that merits some excitement, it is the recognition that out of this period of a crisis of growth may emerge those structures which, for the first time in history, may make both basic and higher human development goals possible of realization for the great majority rather than a minority of the world's people.

The temptation is strong to blame our seeming powerlessness and the destructiveness of our times on human nature. To give in to such a temptation is to despair. It is to say, "we cannot do better because we are condemned from the start." And we thereby both absolve ourselves of responsibility and atrophy our impulse to act.

In this chapter we will consider areas of human potential and how realization of that potential is vitally related to the systems or structures within which persons grow. In particular, we will look at the way the existent system of individual, competing National Security States in an obstacle to fuller human development.

For awhile in the last two decades it seemed as if biological evidence was mounting to incriminate the human species. Negative conclusions about human nature were made on the basis of the works of people such as Robert Ardrey, Konrad Lorenz and Desmond Morris. Homo sapiens was traced as descended from killer apes. Our peculiarly human characteristic of organized warfare against others of the same species was linked with the territorial instincts of our animal antecedents. The implication was that our destructive wasteful behavior, our violent aggression and capacity for wanton killing were attributable primarily to our genetic coding.

But what has so often been overlooked in the human nature-nurture debate is the even more interesting evidence (from earliest cave-time existence to human interaction in contemporary times) of the human capacity and corresponding need for love, affection, esteem, knowledge, peace, justice, unity and many other values related to the quest for meaning; and that these needs and capacities, evidenced in all human groups, are as much a part of our genetic coding as is a capacity for destructive aggression.

Countering the arguments on the side of biological determinism have been a long list of biologists, ethologists, anthropologists and thinkers from other disciplines, including Rene Dubos, Alexander Allard, Jr., Irenaeus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, Leon Eisenberg, Leonard Berkowitz, Morton Hunt, Kenneth Boulding, Ashley Montagu and Margaret Mead, to name a few.

Even a casual observer of human relationships will usually witness more positive than negative human interaction over a given period of time. A visitor present in Guatemala when that country was ravaged by earthquakes in early 1976 was impressed by the way in which people reached out to others even when they were in need themselves. "People who had lost members of their family, food and personal possessions still gave money to help others. The people of San Lucas who escaped the worst of the earthquake, traveled to nearby villages bringing food and water, thus depleting their own reserve."

In *Love and Hate*, a work that deserves to get far more attention than it has in this country, ethologist Iraneus Eibl-Eibesfeldt, a former student of Konrad Lorenz, documents his studies of animal and human behavior. His conclusions bring into balance the negative theories of some biologists and behavioralists. For although in all his studies of different human groups Eibesfeldt found evidence to support biological theories of the inherent human capacity for aggression and hostility, he also found equally evident an inherent capacity for love, affection and human bonding. He found this biological potential and its correlative *need* for love manifest in all the human groups he studied without exception. It was a potential and need given expression in their relationships and responses to each other, their gestures, their greetings, their language and in the social institutions they created.

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The Tasaday, a recently discovered group of cave people in the Philippine Islands, are a living contradiction to the "killer ape" theory of human nature. Living in almost total isolation in the deepest reaches of a huge tropical jungle, and utilizing crudely made tools of stone to survive off wild plants, the Tasaday have developed a society highly advanced in human relationships. All members of this small cave community have an equal share in decision making. Save for childbearing, there is no sex role stereotyping. All alike participate in the gathering of food and its preparation, in the care of children and in other group tasks. In a system of equitable distribution, all food is equally shared among the group, child and adult alike receiving equal portions. The Tasaday have no words for hate or anger or war. They appear to be a society without violence.

Within the frame of monogamous marriage, there is much love and affection shown all members of the group, with individual differences accepted and affirmed. And the few strangers who have appeared suddenly among the Tasaday from the outer world have been warmly welcomed with affection, hugging, stroking, smiling and joy.

It does not matter that the Tasaday or similar human groups are exceptions in contemporary times when violence is everywhere on the increase. Though exceptional, they are not aberrations of human nature, but rather real and symbolic witness of human potential.

Nor does it matter that the Tasaday live in isolation. Indeed, as we will see shortly, it is this isolation that helps make a point central to this book. Secure from military, economic and monetary threats from external forces, the Tasaday need not subordinate other areas of human need and potential to the priorities of mobilization for group security. It is a point to bear in mind as we explore in the next chapters the rationale for a world security system.

Throughout history there have been individuals and groups, and periods of relative human advance, that have appeared as beacons of human potential and possibility. The flowering of knowledge and artistic expression and spiritual insight in all of the great civilizations during periods of relative peace, and the phenomena of such great spiritual leaders as Buddha, Abraham, Jesus, Muhammed and Gandhi in times in which the social and historical milieu was ripe for their ideas and insight, is further evidence that we are not locked in as a species. Rather, the high degree of integral development and humanization achieved by our saints, prophets and great heroes (whose qualities we have too often ascribed to suprahuman capacities and, therefore, beyond our abilities to achieve) are, in reality, evidence of our great potential as a species. Indeed, was not the central mission of these religions to open their followers to a new vision of human possibility? Jesus told his followers — "Even greater things than this can you do if you but believe."

The Role of Social Conditioning

But the potential for greatness is no guarantee of its achievement. The effect, for good or ill, of social structures and social conditioning on human growth cannot be overemphasized. From their studies of human groups, ethologist Eibesfeldt and anthropologist Alexander Alland concluded that while the genetic inheritance of human beings does include a capacity of hate and destructive aggression, it also includes a commensurate capacity for love and human bonding.

What accounts for differences between some human groups and others is environmental conditioning and the social systems of which they are members. That is, either of these capacities — for love or for hate — can be reinforced in such a way that it begets a more dominant set of values and behavior patterns than the other.

Thus, in some societies, aggression, competition, warfare and mistrust have become dominant values, sometimes owing to the legitimate imperatives of survival and sometimes to the illegitimate manipulation of the human capacity for aggression by ruling elites who captialize on this trait as an instrument of war and genocide to serve purposes of greed, power or vengeance. The Nazi extermination of the Jews is only one case in a long history of such manipulation of the human capacity for harmful aggression.

But in other societies the capacity and need for love have been given more positive reinforcement while nonharmful ways have been devised to channel inherent aggression tendencies. Alland and Eibesfeldt both conclude that it is imperative that humankind find ways to develop, and institutions to reinforce, this human genetic propensity to bond with others, and that we learn to extend our inherent capacity to love in widening circles of love and loyalty to humanity as a whole. This conclusion is based on the supposition that it is not possible to change our nature, but it is possible to change the nature of our conditioning.

But while it is paramount that as a species we find and nuture positive alternatives to violent and destructive forms of behavior that threaten our existence today, what needs more explication in the above admonition is the relationship of social structures to such a goal. What kind of social framework is required to make such a "whole earth" identity system, and the human bonding on a global scale feasible? The present system of competing nation-states mitigates against rather than on behalf of nuturing such potential.

A Human Development Paradigm

In recent times there has been a gradual trend in psychology toward a developmental framework within which to view human behavior. The studies of Jean Piaget, Lawrence Kohlberg, Erik Erikson and Abraham Maslow all lead them to parallel conclusions about developmental stages through which all people move in a process of growth or maturation.

The works of these men have provided valuable insight and direction in the fields of education and psychology. The *developmental* prospective they evolved through years of scientific research and study of individual persons and human groups displaced more deterministic theories in their fields and has led to a deeper understanding and appreciation of the human person and the human growth process. It is a perspective that has important bearing on our perception of the nature and potential of the human community as a whole.

We personally find a developmental model more useful than others (such as power or territorial models) for assessing the human condition and possible human future. For one thing, it provides a more holistic perspective, allowing for a greater range

of human behavior and motivation. Secondly, without ignoring negative realities in human behavior, it provides a positive or open view of human potential.

The developmental framework of Abraham Maslow is particularly helpful as a model or paradigm to help us understand where we may now be in our historical growth as a human community.

In a change from the pattern of psychiatrists such as Sigmund Freud, who developed their theories from a study of persons who were psychologically ill, Maslow felt that he would find more solutions to aid in preventing and curing human illness on an individual and mass scale by studying people who were well and the reasons that made them well.

Maslow's subsequent studies of highly developed, self-actualized persons throughout history and in contemporary times led him to conclude that there was a growth process through which all healthy persons passed a series of stages corresponding to human needs and potential. In his schema certain needs are *basic.* These include physical needs (such as food, water, air, etc.); safety needs; belonging, love and esteem needs. Beyond these needs, but just as intrinsic and integrally related to human potential and health, are *meta* needs (*Being* or *meaning* needs). These include the human need and capacity for knowledge, understanding, beauty, truth, goodness, wholeness, justice, peace, universal love, harmony, order, etc. (See Figure A.)

In Maslow's theory, human needs are basically hierarchical in nature. That is, the basic needs must be reasonably met before meaning, or Being, needs and potential can be realized. In this regard, the process of human growth and maturation (or the process of realizing human needs and potential) can be called a process of *Becoming* (more fully human) or a process of *Self-actualization.*

This process of Becoming more fully human, or more fully self, can be imaged as a process of growing more deeply *inward,* (i.e., more in touch with the self within) and, simultaneously, as an outward process of *transcending* self (i.e., becoming more universal in vision and identification). In other words, highly self-actualized persons are highly individualized in the development of their uniqueness as persons and by the very same process of deeper inwardness share deeper unity and harmony with all other persons and the whole of life.

The discovery and nuturing of a self-actualizing person's own inner core is the discovery and nuturing of what is central and common to all humanity. Such persons grow in consciousness of the integral connectedness of their own values, needs and activities to the life and well-being of the whole and they live their lives in deeper accord with that consciousness. Thus Jesus, Gandhi, Martin Luther King, Jr., (and many other unnamed persons past and present, in whom spiritual insight and action were integrated) strove for a peace, justice, unity and love that was *universal,* as well as deeply personal, in its philosophy and applications. Transcending culture, creed, race and other diverse loyalties, their words and lives provided symbolic and real efficacy for more than one group of people only, in one area and one time.

The natural human genetic propensity for bonding and unification, and inherent human needs and potentialities — including the higher meaning or spiritual needs — are a given organic center around which shared global consciousness and world unities can be consciously and creatively nutured for purposes of human survival and human fulfillment.

In Maslow's frame, unmet needs, whether at a basic physical level, or at a deeper level of meaning and being, result in "illness." This "illness," which can be manifested physically, psychologically and/or spiritually, and which can result in negative forms of behavior, is more aptly described as a state of *deprivation* than an aberration or failure of the human person or of human nature.

Deprivation at the level of basic needs almost always *precludes actualization* of the higher (or deeper) levels of potential. Concomitantly, the reasonable satisfaction or fulfillment of basic needs provides a "cure" and permits a *resumption of growth.*

There are four considerations based on Maslow's theory of human development which are directly related to how we assess the human crises of the final quarter of the twentieth century and the viability of human future:

1. With two thirds of the world's people barely able, if at all, to meet physical survival needs for food, shelter and health care, and with the priorities of almost all national societies given to security needs, the human community is still at a relatively early stage of human development.
2. It is possible to view the present sense of malaise and frustration in the human community as related to the *deprivation* of two basic needs on a mass scale. That is, the potential for fuller human development has been straitjacketed by the inability to realize basic *survival* and *security* needs (the first two stages of Maslow's human development model).
3. This does not mean that human nature is evil or that the future is closed. Quite the contrary. It indicates that a concerted *cooperative* effort to meet these basic needs in the world community can open human history to higher stages of actualization.
4. Because the successful negotiation of the stages of human development are greatly affected by social institutions, we need a healthy social framework within which to *become* — individually and as a species — all that we can be. But it is precisely the lack of such social structures on a global level that, in an interdependent world, straitjackets and presents the greatest obstacle to human development.

Historically, those nations and civilizations that have been freed from external threats to their security and safety have had the relative freedom for fuller human development. But except in the few cases of still existent primitive groups such as the Tasaday (whose isolation is not protected by the Philippine government against advancing lumber companies), modern transport, communications and weaponry technologies have ended forever the once effective protection afforded by favorable geography against threats from "foreign" groups. Nor are the large armies and empires of the past any true assurance of group security. The proliferation of nuclear weapons and the growing production and trade of armaments allow no nation the luxury of feeling secure against external threats. Nor is the fear of outside threats limited to armed attack from another group. It is

often much more difficult to provide security from *economic, monetary* and *resource* threats than from military threats.

Because of the end of any effective isolation, the nature of these threats to national security is now constant, precluding the possibility of great periods of relative security in which other human pursuits can flourish. Because these multiple threats are constant, and because there is no global security system adequate to deal with them, nations must now be constantly mobilized to ensure their own survival.

Priority, therefore, is not put on health care, education, environmental needs, the arts and the quality of human life. Justice, peace, truth, beauty and other values at the higher stages of human development are subordinated to values that reinforce this mobilization for survival and security in a nonsecure world. Unable to fulfill their security needs in the present world system, nations and their citizens are straitjacketed at the security stage of human development; thereby they are constrained from significant realization of the higher stages of human potential outlined by Maslow.

The Masculine and Feminine of National Security Values

A particular pitfall of the group security drive and one which has been particularly restrictive on human development is the strong emphasis it has led human groups to place on the values of "competition," "strength," "hardness," "cunning," "shrewdness," and other so-called "masculine" virtues. In most societies, women, who have not had a significant role in providing group security from outside threats, have not been ascribed with these qualities and have been relegated to "inferior" roles not considered as equally vital to the tribal or national life. In some cases where other factors were favorable, this has "freed" women to develop other aspects of their human potential, their capacity for love, affection, warmth, intuitive and esthetic sensitivities, etc., qualities subsequently ascribed as "feminine." The fact that these qualities are part of the genetic potential of all humans, and that a role reversal, such as among the Amazons, could totally reverse the traits ascribing "feminine" and "masculine," has been obscured until very recently.

Alienation

While there is a compelling "logic" for nation-states, in our present world system, to put national security as the top priority, the cost to the quality of human life experienced by its citizenry is great. The frustration of other human needs and the low priority given to other very important human values results in a sense of emptiness, incompletion and alienation.

This growing alienation as well as frustration and powerlessness is easily observed in modern societies. Drug addiction, alcoholism and materialism cannot just be attributed to a lack of discipline or the breakdown of law and order or to human greed or depravity. They are part of the human hunger for something "more" in life, something we unconsciously know is absent. Drug addiction and alcoholism have often been associated with misguided spiritual thirst, with a longing to be in touch with something more meaningful, and with a desire to escape from meaninglessness or to rebel against emptiness. So too, excessive materialism may also be a misguided search for "having more" in lieu of "being more."

There is a strong relationship between the social and human deterioration so widespread today and the deprivation of meaning and other human needs suffered in a system dominated by the security imperative. Unfortunately, in a world system in which there are no other adequate structures through which to provide for national security needs, then it is "logical" and imperative that individual nation-states look out for their own survival even at the cost of the greater common good and fuller human potential.

Today, if we are to humanize the fabric of world society and move away from alienation toward full human development, the organizing principle must be a recognition of *human interdependence.* Other approaches to security have been tried and led to dehumanization.

National self-sufficiency is also failing to provide a humanizing direction in the human community. It is failing because it is based on a fiction. It is a modern impossibility. Chasing this impossible dream saps the human community of the energy and cooperative approaches essential for the fuller development of the human community.

Excessive individualism in the formulation of national policies (disguised under the euphemism of "the national interest") mitigates against the best long-range interest of its own citizenry as well as the interest of the whole human community. The national interest is no longer separable from world interest.

The Program of The I W O

by Saul H. Mendlovitz

An Age of Transformation

It is necessary to understand here the nature of the change that has taken place in this century and become visible within the past few years so that we are clear in our minds how to build on this change, participate in directing it towards preferred goals, and define our own role in it. As I see it, what has taken place so far is a certain heightened awareness, a conscious feeling that we live in a world that is undergoing some rapid and perhaps profound transformation. This feeling seems to be spreading and is by now widely shared, at any rate among the intellectual elites of the world.

Nature of the Transformation

There are a large number of perceptions on the precise nature of the transformation the world is going through in our times. These point to a number of dimensions — techno-economic, demographic, energy and other resources, military, political, and cultural — along which the transformation is taking place; a satisfactory interpretation of it must no doubt take account of all these. On the impact of these changes on the international system, however, there are three different, though not necessarily conflicting, perceptions.

One view is that the age of Western domination is coming to an end and a new framework of interdependence is emerging in the world, in which wealth and power will be more widely distributed among a much larger number of nation-states. The only issue then is whether the Western powers — and their counterparts in the Soviet sphere of hegemony — will accommodate to this change through peaceful means and spirit of cooperation, or whether they will continue to seek to dominate the world and in the process encourage turbulence and war and nuclear proliferation. There is a great deal of truth in this way of looking at global transformation, limited though it is by taking the nation-state system as immutable.

There are others who see the transformation now under way as a disintegration of the nation-state system itself, something as basic as the change that took place when the feudal order disintegrated and gave way to the nation-state system. The argument is that the problems of poverty and starvation, energy and ecology, and above all prevention of cataclysmic wars and nuclear disaster have become too massive to be managed within the nation-state framework. Again, there is a lot in this argument that is not only persuasive but almost self-evident. However, the idea of disintegration of the nation-state system is negative; therefore it is unlikely to engender sufficient effort to carve out an alternative system of governance which could give hope to people and engage them in the process of fundamental reconstruction.

A third and more comprehensive perception of the nature of change we are going through, it seems to me, is that what is at issue is not only the future of the nation-state but the future of fixed territorial existence. Humanity has been used to this idea for a long time, but it may now have run its course. Just as the transition from hunting and pastoral units to settled agriculture and industry involved the organization of the state and, as concomitants thereof, of the institutions of war and slavery as well, today we may be in the throes of an equally epochal change — away from particularistically based territorial settlements serving a variety of agro-industrial units upon which the nation-state system was based, on to a truly global society with a global economy and global culture, and involving global governance. This is the positive perception that should inform both the thesis of growing interdependence and the thesis of impending disintegration of the nation-state system. For, without such an alternative model based on historical analysis, the mere process of system transformation can prove too cataclysmic to be managed peacefully in an age dominated by the two most deadly institutions that territorial "man" has invented — war and poverty.

Response to Global Transformation

If this be our perspective on the nature of global transformation we are going through, our response to such transformation is also likely to be different from others. There are at present three main responses to a rapidly changing reality:

(a) The Managerial Response: This comes from the present bearers of power and wealth who realize the need for change (and some like McGeorge Bundy believe it will be radical and drastic change) but wish to manage it in such a fashion so that whatever global politics emerges they will still be holders of power and wealth. Partially convinced that the arms race and ecological deterioration raise serious questions of the survival of the human race, and concerned with hegemonal security, the major governmental actors appear to have set the framework for a "concert of the globe." The Nixon-Kissinger pentagonal world, while not realized, has a sufficient empirical basis so that hawks within the superpowers and other actors of the putative pentagon have assessed realistically, if not a weakening of ideological fervor, an unwillingness to utilize fully the range of military, economic, and political techniques with which to carry on the struggle for ultimate victory of their beliefs and social system throughout the globe.

The powerful presence of the multinational corporation in the group has led to a second operational principle of containing the change by working out minimal tradeoffs with new loci of power and wealth and in the process of coopting them within the existing framework. In effect, the managerial fix to the crisis

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of world order is to achieve tacit understanding of the major governmental actors of the globe, and with the aid of the multinational corporation, to come to terms with rising centers of regional and economic power: Brazil, Iran, Nigeria & OPEC. The hope is that the problems of the world could be tackled by a minor shift in world power and that the most resourceful challengers to the Western-based international system could be incorporated into the inner circle of decision-making and pacified. The challenge would then dissipate and the game of states could go back to business as usual. In the Western world this kind of "co-optationist" logic informs the thinking of groups such as the Tri-lateral Commission and of those who urge a modified bargain in the international system between dominant Northern interests and the most resourceful countries of the South. In the Third World, governments like Iran, Saudi Arabia, and Brazil seem to be receptive to this kind of logic, more than willing to accept this modified bargain.

(b) The Confrontational Response: Third World governments who find themselves left out from the bargaining framework of the managers are now demanding a share for themselves, too. Their argument is based on the following set of propositions: Human history does not reveal instances where persons who hold wealth, power, and privilege relinquish it voluntarily; that those who wish to share in those "goods" have to struggle, confront, and even perhaps engage in active violence to acquire them. Building on a series of UNCTAD conferences since 1964 and capitalizing on the effectiveness of the oil embargo following the Israeli-Arab conflict of 1973, Third World government officials have made increasingly strident demands on the North. This involves not only increasingly sharp and sometimes shrill rhetoric, but condoning the violence of wars of national liberation and so-called acts of terrorism which go to promoting the participatory positions of Third World aspiring elites. It is not clear to what extent their claims for participating in wealth, power, and privilege will benefit the poor and underprivileged in their own countries, but it is on their behalf that they are making the claim.

It should be understood that the confrontational posture is partially a response to the possibility of a major actors' managerial fix of the entire North. That is, the Soviet bloc until recently and for a variety of reasons — primarily because of its historical lead of having challenged the capitalist colonial powers — has not been identified as part of the North. At the same time, it is also clear that the Soviet bloc is less and less identified, as a psychopolitical matter, as part of the South.

Furthermore, the confrontational posture is not confined to the South. It is espoused by individuals such as Senator Daniel P. Moynihan and groups like the Committee on Present Danger, worried that the world is hostile and increasingly "unmanageable," that recommend that the West, an island of affluence in a world seeking greater equality, should stand up to the forces of barbarism and disorder; as Senator Moynihan would put it, the United States should go into "opposition" as the party of liberty and see to it that the mounting egalitarian challenge be taken on and tamed. For the West, the logic of confrontationism decrees a tough defense posture against the East — hence the pressure for increased defense expenditures — and a firm stand against the egalitarian quest of the Third World.

(c) Self-Reliance: At first glance self-reliance is viewed as a position unique to some idealistically inclined Third World governments which care for the welfare of their people but have no faith in the present world structure as being amenable to genuine redistribution of wealth and power and a genuine acceptance of alternative paths to development. Their view is based on the same set of assumptions summarized above for those promoting a confrontation response: namely that wealth, power, and privilege are never given up willingly. However, in their view the strategy for achieving equivalence and participation requires an initial period of building a solid and secure internal structure before confronting the major actors in the present system. The People's Republic of China, Albania, and Tanzania come to mind as representing this kind of outlook. And as is the case within the posture of confrontation, self-reliance has parallels in the rich Northern segment of the world. Thus, Vice President Nelson Rockefeller promotes Project Independence or Western disengagement for maintaining an industrial society and from the problems of poverty that plague other parts of the world, leaving the poor to stew in their own juices.

The Institute for World Order considers all these responses either too manipulative, too elitist, or too isolationist. None of these responses is adequate to come to terms with the systemic crisis of world order. The managerialists want to tinker when far more drastic surgery is required; they wrongly believe that a mere patching up of the old world order would arrest the drift of the world system toward war, heightened economic inequality, growing despair and alienation, and unprecedented pressure against the world eco-system. The confrontationists are far too negative to construct a better and more viable world. Northern confrontationists are reactionaries who turn their backs on the problems of the poor and risk the prospects of greater militarization and war in a dangerously militarized world. Southern confrontationists are more positive and justifiable in their opposition to the dominant system. But they have proven vulnerable to co-optation, willing to leave less fortunate compatriots behind in order to buy into the bargains and the system of the managers.

Self-reliance is, on balance, a positive option for some Third World states. But it too is insufficient as a systemic response. Self-reliance makes sense in China; but can Chad opt for it? Can Bangladesh? For small, resource-poor countries, self-reliance is an elusive, impossible dream. Ultimately, one is struck with the following inescapable dilemma: Self-reliance can become a convenient slogan for those in the rich world who want to defend their own vested interests by insisting that societies should be autonomous, left alone to enjoy their wealth or to suffer their poverty.

IWO's dissatisfaction with the responses outlined above leads it to adopt a radically different response that I would characterize as one that combines globalism, humanism, and populism — concerned with the world as a whole, working for the humanity and dignity of each being, and aiming at the freedom and welfare of the poorer, deprived and exploited strata of the human family.

Simply put, our case rests on the following set of propositions whose validity is now more easily accepted and shared by others than before. We believe that a drastic process of global transformation is afoot; that the nation-state system is in the throes of a major crisis and that its very logic not only precludes

it from coming to terms with this transformation but, moreover, makes it part of the problem and not the solution; that the dominant perspectives represented by the managers of order in the principal societies of the world are inadequate; that the awesome problems of poverty, war, social injustice, call for new ways of thinking and statecraft. We also believe that awesome as these problems are, they are still amenable to human intervention and therefore reject complacent and pessimistic assessments that see these awesome problems as a counsel for despair and inaction. We take seriously such terms as "humanism" and "populism" to designate our rejection of technocratic solutions and of elitist philosophies that leave the affairs of the world to small and narrow groups of elites.

The "transformation" may be inevitable, given the forces that are at work. But it is by no means certain that it will be benign, sane, and humane. It could be sinister, catastrophic, and tragic. The task of the intellect is to work for the former and to struggle against the latter. It is in that effort that the perception of the transformation and the response to it as outlined above become meaningful.

Third World And World Order

by Fouad Ajami

Ecological balance

By now we know enough to question the assumptions of technological optimists who have traditionally maintained that all is well, that our resources are sufficient and inexhaustible, that our technology will forever produce higher levels of affluence and comfort, and that nature exists to be subdued and dominated. The vision of a cowboy-world economy with unlimited frontiers has clashed with the reality of a finite planet whose life-support system is jeopardized by our current priorities, conceptions, and practices. Our survival depends upon our ability to change our relation to our habitat, our conception of man's place in this universe, our notions of progress and action, and ultimately each person's concept of his or her legitimate share of what this world has to offer. Throughout much of the world, basic notions of freedom will have to change; they have for too long been interpreted as freedom to breed, to purchase, to exhaust resources, and to treat the ecological order with disregard and hostility.

Given our knowledge of the current ecological crisis and of the vulnerability of post-industrial society to any interruption of its awesome and yet very fragile functioning, we know that the ideology of perpetual progress and unlimited growth is dysfunctional if not suicidal. A world threatened with shortages of vital commodities and resources will be by far the closest approximation to a Hobbesian world; man's life would be nothing but 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.' The war of all against all would be fought over finite natural resources, foodstuffs, and livable space. Both rich and poor would live in a nightmarish world, and would become more hardened and desperate. The rich would find the lowering of their living standards unacceptable, and the poor would be reduced to lower levels of poverty where even mere physical survival would be jeopardized. Dignity, peace, justice and welfare would hardly thrive in such a world; they would be irrelevant to its central concerns.

The Third World stands at a critical juncture of history where it can still make crucial decisions concerning ecological balance, resource conservation, and the kind of environment that future generations will inherit. It can opt to sacrifice its future on the altar of present indulgences, and join the destabilizing 'growth olympics,'[1] forgetting that it is destined to trail behind in a race of one-dimensional linear growth whose rules and terrain favor other players and participants. Or it can choose a more austere conception of life which aims at just distribution, and seeks to fulfill the basic needs of all its citizens. A renunciation of the ideology of growthmanship does not imply a strategy of stagnation, passivity, and acquiescence. It only rejects a strategy that ravages the environment, mortgages the future, maldistributes scarce resources, and attempts — unsuccessfully — to duplicate the sad state of affairs at which the advanced and the industrialized societies have arrived. The question for Third World countries is: can the latecomers to the world of modernization learn from the firstcomers (Levy, Jr., 1972)? Can they synthesize the undeniable achievements of the former but avoid their failings, and in the end emerge with a more viable result? Or must they fall into the same pattern and be victimized by the same assumptions, strategies, and commitments?

A serious normative question arises here; it revolves 'round the relationship between those who have 'made it' and those who have not. The dynamics between those who aspire to material abundance and those who are inundated by it are complex and troublesome. Can those who have experienced the dislocations of growth persuade those who have not had that experience that the effort is not a worthwhile one? And do they have the moral right to do so? The question is crucial in the context of relations between rich and poor societies, and more particularly in view of the attempt of reformers and critics in rich societies to persuade Third World leaders, intellectuals, and policy-makers that an alternative to the pursuit of growth and affluence is an ecological and ethical imperative. Some recent arguments have come to identify the critique of growth with class politics, portraying it as a hobby of affluent people who oppose the extension of the benefits of growth to the poor and less fortunate. Workers' jobs, incomes, and rights have been invoked in the defense of growth, and in various circles the critique of growth is dismissed as an elitist exercise or, worse still, a conspiracy to deny poor people their legitimate share of affluence.

Similar arguments pertaining to the future of Third World societies are advanced in the global context. Here again, anti-growth is considered an elitist policy advocated by the affluent, which the poor cannot afford and should not support. Galtung

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(1973) argues that 'ecologism' is basically a middle-class ideology which is incompatible with the welfare of poor societies; its ideological underpinnings are conservative and oriented toward the *status quo*. A more sweeping attack against the limits-to-growth perspective was leveled by a group of young Third World scientists at the United Nations' Stockholm Conference:

> We strongly reject models of stagnation proposed by certain alarmist Western ecologists, economists, industrialists, and computer-fans; and assert that holding economic growth *per se* responsible for environmental ills amounts to a diversion of attention from the real causes of the problem which lie in the profit-motivation of the systems of production in the capitalist world. Likewise we state that the level of consumption (affluence) *per se* is not a cause of environmental problems. Therefore the bulk of the so-called 'ecology movements' in most industrialized countries that stress personal ethics of recycling and non-consumption are (at) best diversionary tactics which fail to put the primary emphasis on the destruction of the profit-oriented system of production.

Galtung and the Third World scientists, in responding to the apolitical model of the Club of Rome's *The Limits of Growth* (Meadows *et al.*, 1972), are no doubt raising serious questions which ought to be placed on the agenda of growth and anti-growth discussions. Galtung is right in criticizing the we-are-all-in-the-same-boat ideology of the Club of Rome. It papers over and obscures the differences between rich and poor individuals and societies; it fails to confront the fact among others, that the rich are the primary polluters and consumers and that they are the ones whose habits and priorities are incompatible with the ecological finiteness of this planet. In treating the world's population as an undifferentiated mass, the Club of Rome neglects to feed into its model the substantial differences of space, resources, and opportunities which different societies, and individuals within societies, 'consume.' In so doing, it overemphasizes the population explosion in the Third World and underemphasizes the true rates of population explosion in rich societies which, though numerically lower, are in reality more threatening to the world's resources and ecological stability. Davis (1970) and Falk (1972), both sensitive to this issue, point out that the United States may be growing ten times as fast as India when one feeds into the calculation the differences between American and Indian standards of living.

To place the moral burden of the ecological crisis on the poor, or to assign them responsibility equal to that which is assigned to the rich, is to be guilty of a cruel kind of insensitivity and blindness. Moreover, from the perspective of the Club of Rome, it is a betrayal of the very canons of scientific evidence and precision that its project prides itself upon. But equally naive and blind is the suggestion by the Third World scientists at Stockholm that capitalism alone is the cause and source of our ecological crisis. Capitalism and its productive apparatus are no doubt partly responsible for our current predicament. Private profit is accumulated at the expense of the public interest; basic needs are neglected in favor of superfluous ones; the environment and society at large bear the costs — euphemistically called externalities by economists — of the profits and activities of private entrepreneurs. But the crucial variable in the ecological crisis does not seem to be the form of ownership. Whether private or public, industrial production can pollute, ravage, and inflict damage upon the world. Powell (1971) finds the same indifference to the environment in the Soviet Union that we generally associate with capitalism: 'Socialist industrialists, no less than their capitalist counterparts, have shown themselves capable of despoliation on a massive scale . . . Production for production's sake has led not only to economic disorientations, but to social and ecological blunder as well.' Apparently, the production quota can be as ruthless as the corporate annual report and the profit statement.

The Third World must develop an outlook that appreciates and comprehends the realities of a fragile ecological order, coupled with a concern for the future and for what the present generation will leave behind for future generations. Short-range goals and strategies to exploit nature may bring immediate benefits and relief, but a more future-minded orientation is needed if genuine and sustained development is to be at all possible. There is an unfortunate and little understood relationship between political instability in the Third World and the absence of futurist orientations and perspectives. Vulnerable regimes interested in their own political survival cannot think far into the future. Uppermost in the minds of the elites who govern a good number of Third World societies is what the next morning might bring. Political crises are relieved through catering to consumer demands; budget deficits and needs are met through increased production and export of raw materials at the expense of conservation; and arms are secured with the sale of agricultural crops. The ecological question in much of the Third World is directly linked to the resolution of the crises of legitimacy and to the creation of just and viable societies. As long as these crises are not resolved, the elites in control of public policies throughout the Third World will continue to relegate the ecological question to minor importance, or ignore it altogether.

Another serious matter is the pressure on the Third World, both internal and external, to play the role of the 'ecological Delaware' in the world economy. Runaway industries, unwilling to comply with the environmental regulations and standards of rich countries, are seeking and often successfully finding ecological havens throughout the Third World. The entire problem is a testimony to our urgent and desperate need for global regulations, standards, and enforceable laws — strict and universal laws that leave no loopholes for polluters and no frontiers across which they can migrate. Once again the world is caught between the insensitivity of the powerful and the despair of the weak; the former manage on their own — or at least think they do — and the latter, in their vulnerability, are so anchored in time and space that they are unable to think of a time or a world beyond their own.

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[1]The term is borrowed from Staffan Linder (1970).

Women And World Order

by Patricia Mische

WAR VERSUS WOMEN

. . . the arms race and mobilization for war continue to have a negative bearing on the status of women today.

It was not just that war made travel and communications more difficult. This was certainly a negative factor, for it imposed major obstacles to women's efforts to build their movement across national lines.

Even more significant was the fact that in nations involved in war or preparing for the possibility of war, military mobilization took predominance over all other concerns — including women's rights and suffrage issues. It was difficult to keep women's issues in the public forum or receive a serious hearing in the face of threats to national survival.

An even more profound factor was the effect that militarization had in sex-role differentiation in the first place.

Historically, men, who had greater muscular strength, were entrusted with the task of defending the tribe, the city-state, the kingdom or the nation. Women contributed to group security and survival in another way — through child-bearing and nurturing. Boys were trained in values and skills related to cunning, competition, prowess, courage, strength and aggressiveness, which came to be prized as "masculine" values. Values associated with the nurturing role, such as gentleness, patience, love, came to be labeled "feminine." Thus war and its preparations obscured and restricted the human potential in both men and women for a more fully human experience.

Further, because "masculine" values were considered more essential to group survival they came to be more highly esteemed along with the men embodying them most fully. "Feminine" values, as important as they were to the group, could not ensure survival and could even mitigate against it in combat. Thus, in many societies organized for military security, these values — and the people who embodied them (usually women) — were considered of less worth.

The assertion by women of their personal worth and rights represented more than a threat to male dominance. It represented a threat to a social order built on military strength and supremacy. For the early suffragettes by and large did not advocate equality at the expense of their "feminine values." They did not aspire to the so-called "masculine values" related to militarism. They saw their goals of equality integrally related not only to the causes of suffrage and emancipation but also to the cause of peace. Many were pacifists — as opposed to war as they were to sexist inequities.

This may be due in part to the high percentage of Quaker women who were active in leading the cause of suffrage. Unlike women in most other religions or sectors of society, Quaker women were accustomed to speaking in Quaker meetings and knew what contributions they could make. The number of Quaker women who became leaders and spokeswomen within the women's movement was thus out of proportion to their numbers in the population.

But it was not only the Quaker women who rejected militarism. So did many others, perhaps sensing that militarism would in the long run work against the best interests of women.

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The Draft Dilemma

Up to now, women have been barred from combat duty in the U.S. Armed Forces. Electronic and technological warfare, however, blurs the distinction between combat and non-combat activity. As warfare becomes more dependent on electronic skills, women, if not consciously choosing alternatives, may have a larger role in it. In the words of one Pentagon official: "For a woman, being in a foxhole may be impractical. Flying a bomber is not. It should be up to the service secretaries to decide what a woman should do."

Already the U.S. Defense Department has asked Congress to undo the present law barring women in combat and to permit the various service branches to determine the types of duty to which women can be assigned. There are a number of reasons for such a request. The present lag in volunteer recruitment could be offset by recruiting women for more positions. Demands by women's advocacy groups and criticism about the status of women in the military in studies such as that from the Brookings Institute are having a "successful" impact. Opening more positions to women would enable the military to show a cleaner record in regards to women's rights.

Women have "come a long way." Or have we? Should women really applaud this equality as "progress?" I question whether it represents any true form of progress at all — for men or women.

To laud these developments leaves totally unchallenged the notion that the human community should tolerate the development of nuclear weapons in the first place, much less whether anyone — male or female — should be mentally, physically and spiritually conditioned to use them. It leaves totally unchallenged the assumption that preparation for planetary devastation is an acceptable form of human behavior. It leaves unchallenged the notion that national security and well-being can truly be attained by the use of weapons that can destroy all human life many times over.

What measure progress if equality for women means equal annihilation for ourselves and our children? And what measure progress if the equality we seek is rooted in a form of power that breeds violence and destroys faith in the future?

And what measure progress if women in some nations realize ultimate destructive power at the expense of the most basic needs and goals of women around the world?

The example of women working in Titan missile silos was given not to single out or condemn women in the military services, but by way of raising a question which has broader implications. Should women push for equality without critically

assessing the structures in which they work and the ends and uses of their new found power?

If we accept structures and patterns of dominance as presently constituted, looking only to getting a share of the pie, we will liberate no one — not ourselves, not our children, not our world. We will have a piece of the pie. But that pie will nourish neither us nor the world. We will have equality — but at the expense of our life and humanness.

Maybe instead, we should be trying to create quite another pie. For a true advance in human affairs will not be furthered by more and more women being assimilated into a literally "man-made" world. Rather, it will evolve when women and men together create a new future — one that nurtures human survival, well-being and realization for all people — male or female — on this planet.

World Order Declaration

by Fouad Ajami and Richard Falk

Rarely has there been such widespread agreement across ideologies and throughout the world that humankind is in the midst of a rare period of history in which forces of creativity and destruction contend together in decisive and critical struggle. The forces of destruction are perhaps more obvious to us; we live daily with interpersonal brutality and social/political violence; expectations that rose after WWII have turned to disillusionment; our achievements seem empty; we are apprehensive about the future because it seems determined by forces that defy human will and human choices. The old maps to guide us through life no longer provide reliable direction; the old ideologies stand discredited or irrelevant. At best, the patterns of control of the entrenched elites promise to stabilize faltering systems a while longer. But even such a limited goal, hardly worthy in a time of danger and acknowledged injustice, is beginning to lose its appeal and credibility. For growing numbers of thoughtful and concerned individuals their links to established practices, institutions, and ideologies have snapped. Out of the bleakness of danger and frustration arises the potential for creativity, for response, for reversal and transformation. At present, we dance awkwardly between destruction and renewal.

Global trends require drastic changes both in our perceptions of the world and in our practices as inhabitants of it, if we are to construct for ourselves and for the poor and the weak among us a just and livable world. These trends, described once more here, generate deepening problems that are by now familiar to all; to contemplate them is to realize how established elites, institutions, and practices have largely failed the masses and therefore all of us, how a world historical process that continues along the present path is destined to produce deepening disparities and to be pushed into a variety of foreseen and unforeseen catastrophes.

Militarism:

We live in a militarized world system. The two superpowers engage in a continuing and consuming contest that drains world resources by allocating each year more than $200 billion to assemble a growing arsenal of death, while fundamental human needs are ignored. In addition, these superpowers lead the way in spreading the most destructive weaponry throughout the world system. $300 billion are currently spent annually on military goods and services, and the figure keeps rising. Maintaining this deadly arsenal absorbs the talent of roughly half the world's scientific effort at a time when cities, both in the industrialized countries and in the Third World, are rotting, when our capacity to feed a growing world population seems beyond our will or imagination, when the elderly, the sick, and the young are left alone to be degraded, to go hungry, to forego education and jobs, and all too often, to perish or to go through life bearing scars from our civilizational priorities.

To reverse the spiral of militarism and proliferation requires a reversal of energy, above all, at the top of the system. It requires the superpowers to initiate a process of demilitarization and denuclearization (of which nonproliferation strategy can then become a subsidiary part), of ending the arms race between themselves, of curtailing arms sales to repressive, militarized regimes, and of carrying their own plans beyond programs for arms stabilization. To begin in this direction, the superpowers could pledge to refrain from the use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states, to renounce first use options for nuclear weapons, to honor comprehensive test ban, to support a world disarmament conference, all undergirded by seriousness to dismantle the war system. Until such a beginning is made it is pious and futile to lecture about the dangers of a nuclearized world.

Poverty and Deprivation:

During three decades of policy-making, rich and poor countries alike and international financial institutions have worshiped at the altar of economic growth. However, amidst unprecedented affluence and productivity, somewhere between half a billion to more than two billion human beings suffer from hunger and malnutrition. More than half of humanity is denied shelter and education as well as adequate nutrition.

Yesterday economic growth was marketed as the panacea for our problems, as the way to feed and house the poor, to enfranchise and employ them.

Today that vision has lost its appeal and legitimacy as we have come to realize that a global apartheid between the rich and the poor is a harsh reality. Within and among nations, ruling elites possess no humane vision about what to do with the poor and the "dispensable." Their strategies alternate between be-

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nign neglect and outright repression. In an extreme form, neglect is justified in the rich countries by reference to the argument of triage, the ultrarationalistic argument that regards the difficulties of the poorest societies as hopeless and considers efforts and resources offered on their behalf as futile and wasteful. Constructive solutions to these problems, the rich triagogues argue, require hard choices about which societies should live and which should die and toughness to live, albeit numbly, with the consequences of those choices.

Authoritarianism and the Attack on Human Rights:

The trends of militarization and inequality underpin another: repression, authoritarianism, and the increasingly blatant attack on human rights. Repression rises inevitably as part of the governing process in societies where growing inequalities have to be defended, where the capacity to extract a surplus from the urban and rural poor is assisted by the whip and the torturer. In a world where the distinction between "war" and "peace," "military" and "civilian" have become increasingly blurred and where inequalities intersect with a heightened determination to resist them, repression is inevitably woven into the fabric of political life. "Progressive" and "reactionary" regimes alike resort to it. Honesty should compel all to realize that repression comes from the right as well as from the left. One is inflicted in the name of order; the other in the name of revolution, and they should both be condemned.

Ecological Factors:

The world eco-system is overloaded and vulnerable. Overconsumption, the exploitation of nature, the commitment to unbridled economic growth have undermined the very foundations of our habitat. The concern with the environment, yesterday a marginal issue, now poses questions about survival and human prospect. But here, too, care is needed lest the concern for the environment turn into a strategy for political reaction and conservatism that raises the ecological issue in order to delegitimize the demands of the poor for their just share of a finite world. Concern for the environment that is politically motivated by conservatism makes it seem impractical to redistribute wealth and income in a world situation of growing scarcity, thus intensifying the struggle over shares of the global product. Commitment to the environment must move beyond the issue of pollution of land, sea, and air to include the preservation of natural and cultural heritages of the peoples of the world, the conservation of scarce resources, and the protection of endangered animal and plant species.

De-Humanization and Alienation:

The trends so far described are "objective" ones. But there is another, equally profound concern, a more "subjective" one which affects the inner being of men and women and the quality of human existence and relations. Our public opinion polls, our more intuitive writers and artists depict increasing alienation and civilizational emptiness. Expression of this malaise naturally varies from one culture to another as do the conditions which bring it about. In poor countries, unemployment, urban overcrowding, and crushing poverty demean countless human beings who are increasingly cut off from meaning once accorded them by traditional religious symbols, family ties, and communal forms of identification. All these traditional means of identification are being undermined by technological and cultural developments which have set humans adrift and have nearly destroyed old systems of values and meaning without generating equally viable ones. In rich countries the causes and symptoms may be different, though here, too, the impact of the "modernization" process is apparent. A super-urbanized technocratic culture and an increasingly less congenial ecological setting force most individuals to live isolated from their natural and human surroundings. Most are encumbered with meaningless work. It is not surprising that severe loneliness, atomization, and bitter resentment toward others results from these conditions. Violence and brutality erupt in every dimension of modern life and are increasingly commonplace in entertainment.

Formidable as the odds may be, individuals and groups committed to global justice, concerned about building a viable, decent future for humanity, are urged to heed the call to build a serious movement at this time. The world desperately needs alternatives both to the drift of present trends and to the managerial fixes visualized by dominant elites throughout the world. These elites have powerful transnational linkages that cut across national boundaries; they have power and money at their disposal. One of their chief agents of influence is the multinational corporation. To oppose such an array of forces requires a globally-conceived effort that builds its strength from the bottom up. Except for the most ostrich-like, all of us realize that most of the political, economic, social advantages lie with established forces; entrenched elites have greater resources, power, and wealth at their disposal, as well as the facilities of the modern state. But to recognize the odds, and to accurately read the political situation should not lead us to abandon the personal, social, political, and cultural quest for change. We need to strike a balance between the complacency of those who say that all is well and the fatalism of those who abandon the quest before it begins because it looks too difficult. In such a context, it is incumbent upon those who oppose the current drift of things to organize, to speak to one another, to communicate, and where possible, to act, ever seeking to engage in the struggle.

To urge a global movement is not to overlook the legitimate situational differences of individual, groups, and nations. Clearly the struggle for a better world if it is to be meaningful, has to be waged in response to the constraints and opportunities of each relevant political setting. What is good for one part of the world may not be or yet seem appropriate for another. The question of nationalism and the role of state power comes immediately to mind. Traditionally, "globalism" viewed nationalism and state power as negative, as obstacles to the attainment of a just and peaceful world. But some now recognize that for many Third World societies and national liberation movements, the issue of self-determination is central and a critical precondition for a more egalitarian and just world. Hence, the perspective on nationalism should be dependent on the context: what is to be urged or discouraged in a Northern industrial context obviously differs from the things that should be sought or avoided in southern Africa, the Middle East, or South Asia. We are not for or against nationalism *per se;* it depends on its given roles in each

context separately considered. State power may thwart equality in one part of the world, and conceivably promote and protect it in another. What is true for nationalism and statism also applies to a variety of other "isms" and "movements" liberalism, feminism, peace movement, ecology movement. We cannot generalize beyond context, nor beyond the specific relation between means and ends necessary to bring a just world system into being. Very often difficult tradeoffs have to be made, and the perspective of one group may fail to impress another dominated by wholly different priorities, but there is no substitute for a politics that begins with the actual needs and aspirations of peoples in their various world situations. The usable elements in the prevailing ideologies should be salvaged; others should be discarded. From liberalism we should retain the tradition of restraints upon arbitrary authority; governing groups and official institutions should be subject to political forms and procedures that put checks on the abuse of state power. But we should also recognize liberalism's failure to pay sufficient attention to socio-economic justice that includes the rights of the poor and of subordinate minorities in the West as well as in the Third World. From socialism we must retain and develop the commitment to equity and social justice, but we must also be cognizant of its propensity to bureaucratic centralism, political authoritarianism, and tyranny. The socialism of the future should be one with a humane face that synthesizes the best elements of liberalism and yet neither kills the life of the spirit, nor secularizes it in churches that help the rich and powerful pacify the poor, enabling the strong minority to exploit the weak masses. From populism we should borrow opposition to excessive elitism, centralization and bureaucratism, as well as the doubts about high technology and the "progress" myths that human development is an automatic by-product of a stream of technological innovations. We should guard against the racist and parochial streak discernible in populist movements. From humanism we should accept and nurture the conviction that human fulfillment is the only proper goal for either politics or production.

The quest for an appropriate ideology should be our main goal at this time. In addition, we see our work as having some other political objectives. We also seek to develop a network of individuals and groups who are potential allies in the struggle for global change, but who also are rooted in the particularity of their limited concerns bounded by space and circumstance. We seek to expand the net of solidarity and to find adequate ways of communicating across boundaries of diverse situation. We want to join others in searching for the links between local issues and global ones, for the way in which neighborhoods and communities can understand the relationship between their local needs and life-space and broader global forces and developments. Furthermore, we are committed to connecting concern about present issues with concern for the future possibilities and vice versa. This connectedness is badly needed because an exclusive focus on the present leads to inappropriate policy and jeopardizes the life-chances of future generations. Finally we accept the obligation in concert with all others who share the commitment to a just world to evolve and disseminate serious policy recommendations and alternatives.

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